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Latin American countries are generally characterized 
as displaying high income and earnings inequality 
overall along with high inequality by gender, race, and 
ethnicity. However, the latter phenomenon is not a major 
contributor to the former phenomenon. Using household 
survey data from four Latin American countries (Bolivia, 
Brazil, Guatemala, and Guyana) for which stratification 
by race or ethnicity is possible, this paper demonstrates 
(using Theil index decompositions as well as Gini indices, 
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and 90/10 and 50/10 percentile comparisons) that 
within-group earnings inequality rather than between-
group earnings inequality is the main contributor to 
overall earnings inequality. Simulations in which the 
relatively disadvantaged gender and/or racial/ethnic 
group is treated as if it were the relatively advantaged 
group tend to reduce overall earnings inequality measures 
only slightly and in some cases have the effect of 
increasing earnings inequality measures.  
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Latin American countries are generally characterized as exhibiting both high wage and 
earnings inequality
1—and significant gender,
2 racial, and ethnic-related inequality.
3  Hence an 
interesting question to ask is: To what extent are these two features interrelated? 
In this paper we address this question by considering how greater equality by gender and 
race/ethnicity in distribution of labor earnings would affect overall labor earnings inequality.  
Using household survey data from four Latin American countries for which it is possible to 
calculate earnings separately by race (Brazil and Guyana) or ethnicity (Bolivia and Guatemala), 
we calculate a number of inequality indexes, both overall and separately by race/ethnicity and 
gender.  We show that there is significant gender and intraracial/ethnic group earnings inequality 
as well as substantial overall earnings inequality. 
We then recalculate the overall labor earnings inequality index under a series of 
assumptions that increasingly treat members of the worse-off gender and/or racial/ethnic group 
as if they were members of the better-off group.  We show, using a relatively new empirical 
methodology developed by Bourgignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998),
4 that these steps do not have 
a large effect in reducing overall inequality measures, and indeed can increase inequality 
measures in some cases.  This is not surprising, given the high levels of intragroup inequality that 
we have shown and the many unobservable factors that affect wages.  However, this may be 
surprising to those who have not seen these intragroup measures previously. 
                                                 
1 There are many overall inequality studies that consider all or part of the Latin American and Caribbean region 
(LAC), and some also compare LAC to all or part of the rest of the world. See Psacharopoulos et al. (1995), 
Londoño and Székely (1997), Inter-American Development Bank (1998), Morley (2001), Székely and Hilgert 
(1999, 2007), De Ferranti et al. (2004) World Bank (2004), and Medrano, Sanhueza, and Contreras (2006) for 
overviews of the inequality discussion in Latin America, and Deininger and Squire (1996) for the world comparison. 
Studies that consider the intergenerational transmission of inequality in LAC include Behrman, Gaviria and Székely 
(2001), which finds that LA is less mobile than the US and that mobility is associated with education; and Barros 
and Lam (1993) and Lam (1999), both of which consider intergenerational transmission of educational inequality in 
Brazil.  
2 In terms of gender analysis in the LAC region, Tzannatos and Psacharopoulos (1992) find that across the region, 
women’s earnings and labor force participation are consistently lower than men’s. Also see Saavedra (2001), who 
looks at female wage inequality in LAC, Brown, Pagga, and Oreggia (1999), on Mexico, Esquivel and Paz (2003) 
on Argentina, and Pagan (2002) on Guatemala. 
3 LAC studies on race and/or ethnicity are scarce, with country-level studies of Brazil comprising the bulk of the 
research. Notable studies on indigenous groups include Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) and Hall and Patrinos 
(2006), both of which conclude that indigenous peoples are systematically pooer than non-indigenous peoples. 
4 Other studies using this type of methodology include Bouillon, Legovini, and Lustig (1998), Ferreira and Paes de 
Barros (1999), Bravo, Contreras, Rau, and Urzua (2000), Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2001), Bourgignon, 
Ferreira, and Leite (2002), Ferreira and Leite (2005), and Gasparini, Marchionni, and Escudero (2005). Bourguignon 
and Spadaro (2006) discuss the use of this methodology to evaluate social policies. 
1 Hence this paper both contributes new empirical results from these so-far rarely utilized 
household surveys,
5 and presents a new angle regarding the causes of inequality and potential 
consequences of gender and/or race/ethnicity-related anti-discrimination policy measures. 
Below we first present the baseline inequality measures for the four countries.  We also 
present conventional Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions to indicate how much of earnings 
differences by race/ethnicity/gender is related to differences in characteristics between the 
groups and how much is related to differences in treatment.
6 
We then describe and implement an extension to the Blinder-Oaxaca methodology, 
developed by Bourguignon et al. (1998) and implemented in Bourguignon et al. (2002).  Herein 
we consider how various characteristics are generated and simulate these processes before 
simulating or decomposing earnings.  For example, under the assumption that educational 
attainment is generated differently by race/ethnicity/gender group, we allow education to be 
generated for the worse-off group by the process associated with the better-off group, and then 
use predicted education in place of actual education in simulating earnings for the worse-off 
group.  To our knowledge, we are the first to use this technique to consider within-country 
differences between race/ethnicity/gender groups.
7 
We compare our actual earnings inequality measures to inequality measures calculated 
using the simulated earnings data for the worse-off group.  We show that this simulation has 
little effect on overall inequality in the majority of cases.  Instead, within-group inequality 
persists and drives the over-all inequality. We show that this finding holds up for per capita 
household earnings measures as well as for individual earnings, so that household structure, and 
the income sharing that may occur within households, does not mitigate this result.  In the 
conclusion, we consider what implications our findings have regarding the efficacy of anti-




                                                 
5 See Székely and Hilgert (2007) for a discussion of the problems with using LAC household surveys. 
6 This is the standard methodology used to understand wage differentials; when applied to LAC data, studies 
typically find that the majority of the wage gap between either gender or racial categories is due to differences in 
characteristics—see Garcia-Aracil and Winter (2006) on Ecuador, Hall and Patrinos (2006) for a range of countries, 
Patrinos (1997) on Guatemala, MacIsaac and Patrinos (1995) on Peru. 
7 This statement holds as of the date of our original working paper, August 2003. 
  2Patterns of earnings inequality 
While it is quite common to find commentaries mentioning differences in the extent of 
inequality by gender,
8 race, and ethnicity
9 in Latin America, along with decrying the overall 
extent of inequality, it is far less common to see a formal analysis of to what extent the former is 
responsible, or in any way linked, to the latter.  Psacharapoulos and Patrinos (1994) have tackled 
the estimation of racially and/or ethnically separate earnings equations for Latin American 
countries and attempted to measure the contribution of racial and ethnic differences to earnings 
differences. In addition, in the earnings equation decomposition literature, it is rare to see any 
reaggregation of the data into a measure of overall earnings inequality in order to be able to see 
how various counterfactual calculations might affect such a measure. 
It is particularly difficult to study the differential patterns of earnings inequality by 
race/ethnicity across all of the Latin American and Caribbean countries because many Censuses 
and labor force or household surveys do not ask questions delineating race (Florenz, Medina, and 
Urrea 2001).  We surveyed the most recent available household surveys for these countries at the 
time our project began in 2003, and found four in which there is both sufficient coding to be able 
to separate out “dominant” and “disadvantaged” groups by race/ethnicity and sufficient sample 
sizes to be able to estimate separate earnings regressions by gender and race/ethnicity.  These are 
the 1999 Encuesta Continua de Hogares for Bolivia, the 1996 Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra da 
Domicilio for Brazil, the 2000 Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida for Guatemala, and 
the 1999 Survey of Living Conditions for Guyana.  These countries all have either sizable Afro-
descendant or Indigenous populations, with Brazil and Guyana having the two highest 
percentage Afro-descendant populations (44.7% and 42.6% respectively) and Bolivia and 
Guatemala having the two largest reported indigenous populations (71% and 66% respectively) 
in Central and South America.  Guyana is also interesting in that the “dominant” population is of 
South Indian background (Indo-origin, in our terminology below) rather than white background 
(in contrast to the other three countries).  So while we use the term “white” as shorthand to refer 
                                                 
8 Women still lag behind men in most indicators of well-being — wage gaps, control over resources, voice, health 
care (Cunningham et al, 2004) — but there are increasingly noted trends of disadvantage among men, including 
higher death rates, alcoholism, and suicides than women, as well as particularly in LAC countries a reduction in 
their rate of higher educational attainment (Jacobsen 2006). 
9 Sociologists have theorized that racial or ethnic inequalities are a result of a history of power relations that create 
an unlevel playing field through setting up a situation wherein endowments, opportunities, and/or expectations differ 
by demographic gruop (Baiocchi 2003). These theories are becoming salient as ethnic and racial groups are 
  3to the dominant group in each society, the dominant group in Guyana is not actually white, and 
in each society the nondominant group varies in its composition (ranging from more Afro-
descendant dominated in Brazil and Guyana, to indigenous group-dominated in Bolivia and 
Guatemala). Because these countries have the largest non-white populations in Latin America, if 
the main source of inequality was between groups, then equal treatment would have a large 
impact on overall inequality measured for the country. However, these countries may also not 
have as much inequality between groups because they have such large non-white populations, 
and therefore it may be worth in the future also investigating other countries with smaller non-
white populations (e.g., Chile) to see if they are more marginalized, once such data become 
available. 
Table 1 displays various measures of hourly earnings inequality for these four countries, 
overall and by gender-racial/ethnic group.  We utilize the Theil (1) and (0) indexes, the Gini 
index, and ratios of 90/10 and 50/10 points in the income distribution to describe earnings 
inequality.
10  We choose these five inequality indices as ones that are well known and often 
calculated; thus they can be compared to those found in other countries and/or for other time 
periods.  In addition, the indexes give us different ways of thinking about inequality, with the 
90/10 focusing our attention on the tails of the distribution, the 50/10 focusing on the lower half 
of the distribution, and the other three indices summarizing the full distribution.  While the Gini 
index is perhaps the best known, the Theil family of indices are of particular interest to us 
because they can be decomposed into within and between group components, as will be done 
below. 
We see that, with the notable exception of Guyana, earnings inequality is high measured 
by any of these standards.  But, strikingly, inequality is not only high overall, but also 
comparably high within each of the four gender-racial/ethnic groups.  Also, no one racial-gender 
or ethnic-gender group is the most unequal consistently across the sample.  While the most 
unequal wage distribution in Brazil is that of white men, Indo-women have the largest inequality 
in earnings in Guyana and indigenous women tend to have the highest earnings inequality in 
Bolivia and Guatemala. 
                                                                                                                                                             
increasingly reshaping their cultures and raising their voices for equal rights and a greater share of the opportunities 
in their countries (Arocha 1998). 
10 For the formal definitions of the Gini, Theil (1), and Theil (0) indexes, as well as a discussion of index 
decomposition, see Litchfield (1999), Cowell (2000), or Cowell (2005). 
  4Table 2 shows the results from standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of log earnings, 
comparing in turn men and women within race, whites and nonwhites within gender, and white 
men to nonwhite women.
11 Women tend to receive a relatively higher payoff from economic 
attainment than do men (with the notable exception of white women in Guatemala). 
Table 2 shows that Guyana has noticeably small wage differentials by race/ethnicity, 
while Bolivia has the smallest wage differential by gender within the dominant group and 
Guatemala has the widest gender differentials.  Notably, while racial/ethnic differences 
(controlling for gender) have a large characteristics component,
12 gender differences (controlling 
for race/ethnicity) have a large differences-in-treatment component. Indeed, women’s 
characteristics in both Bolivia and Brazil (and in Guyana for Afro-origin women) would 
contribute to lowered earnings inequality if it were not for the offsetting effects of differences in 
coefficients.  While the “endowed” differences between races/ethnicities are by region and 
education, the differences between men and women are primarily in employment position.  The 
difference in wages by race/ethnicity that can be attributed to returns to endowments (i.e., the 
differences in coefficients) is primarily due to education.  The returns to education are also 
important for explaining the gender wage gap, but returns to other factors also emerge as 
important. 
A focus on decompositions such as provided in Table 2 makes it appear as though 
earnings differences would decline notably if differences in treatment (i.e., differences in 
coefficients) were eradicated, and also that race/ethnicity differences would diminish 
substantially in all countries save Guyana if differences in characteristics were narrowed.  
                                                 
11 This paper’s technical appendix, available from this World Bank website, contains the full regression results used 
to create these decompositions, including the first stage multinomial logit results and the final stage OLS earnings 
regressions for the multi-stage simulation described below. The surveys vary in sample size, availability of 
variables, and goodness of fit of the earnings equations. While the four country surveys used herein were chosen in 
part because they had relatively good and also relatively similar data available, the specifications are not identical 
due to data limitations and coding differences.  However, some standard patterns of returns occur across all four 
countries, namely the constancy of positive returns to higher educational attainment, and a traditional quadratic 
relationship between age and earnings that is remarkably similar across the four countries. There are positive 
relationships to earnings of being in urban rather than rural settings, and having employment in a relatively more 
formal sector. 
12 This has been found in other studies of Latin American data, including MacIsaac and Patrinos (1995), using 
Peruvian data, which finds fifty to seventy percent of the log earnings gap between indigenous and nonindigenous 
men due to differences in characteristics; Patrinos, Velez, and Psacharopoulos (1994), which finds seventy-eight 
percent of the difference between Spanish and Guarani speakers due to differences in characteristics; and 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994), although Patrinos (1997) points out variation in the proportion attributable to 
characteristics among the various ethnic groups within Guatemala. Our result is partly consistent with Soares (2000), 
  5However, neither of these measures necessarily translates into substantially reduced overall 
earnings inequality.  Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are decompositions at the mean 
characteristic values for the sample and do not give good insight about the full differential 
distributions of characteristic values in each subsample.
13  Differences in characteristic 
distributions within each subsample generate the within subsample earnings differences that we 
observe in Table 1.  Therefore, even if mean characteristics were equalized within each group as 
well as treatment of those characteristics, substantial overall earnings inequality could still exist 
in the society because of the spread in characteristics—and potentially in returns to 
characteristics—within groups.  In the next section we consider how to simulate both more equal 
characteristic distributions and more equal treatment and how these simulations would affect 
measures of overall earnings inequality. 
 
Simulating more equal treatment to assess its effects on overall earnings inequality 
In this section we move beyond the simple Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition framework by 
simulating wages using firstly the Oaxaca-Blinder framework in which only returns are 
equalized, and secondly by using an expanded framework in which both returns and the 
processes generating some of the underlying characteristics are equalized.  We then compare the 
actual earnings inequality indexes to the one calculated for the distributions of simulated wages 
under both of these frameworks. 
Operationally, the expanded framework consists of allowing some of the variables in the 
earnings equation to be determined by earlier processes that are also estimated separately by 
group.  There is certainly evidence, both in the Latin American context and for other regions and 
countries, that earlier processes affect outcomes that then affect earnings.  For example, Patrinos 
and Psacharopoulos (1997) find that family background has an impact on educational attainment 
and grade repetition.  And it is certainly the case that observers believe that these processes have 
severe effects that differ by group; witness Tzannatos (1999, p. 551): “To break the vicious circle 
of women's low initial human capital endowments and inferior labor market outcomes compared 
                                                                                                                                                             
who, using Brazilian data, finds the difference between men by race to be mainly driven by characteristics, though 
among women by race it is driven mainly by differences in treatment. 
13 Other decompositions can be performed which do consider the variance in outcomes across the earnings 
distribution; for instance see Yun (2006), who creates a valuable extension on the more widely known Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce (1993) method; quantile regression analysis is another strategy.  We choose to focus the paper 
  6to men's, the paper proposes greater access of girls to education and of women to training, 
enforceable equal pay and equal employment opportunities legislation, a taxation and benefits 
structure that treats reproduction as an economic activity and women as equal partners within 
households, and a better accounting of women's work to include invisible production.” 
Following the Bourguignon et al. (2002) method, we simulate conditional distributions 
for occupational choice, education, fertility (for women only), and non-labor income.  In 
addition, as it is possible that an individual observed in an occupational status without wages 
(i.e., self-employed and non-employed persons) needs to be simulated as being in another 
occupational status, the random error terms are drawn for the simulations from the counterfactual 
distribution of error terms.
14  Bourguignon et al. apply their method to considering differences in 
household income distribution across countries; however, it is readily modifiable to considering 
differences in household income distribution—or individual income or earnings distributions—
across demographic groups within a country. 
To summarize the approach in equation format, consider the two equations for earnings Y 
for (subscript) groups 1 and 2, with each vector Y expressed as a function of matrices of 
explanatory variables X and Z, where the Z-variables are endogenous, and are functions of the 
matrix of explanatory variables H (which may contain a subset of the variables in X); all 




Y1 = X1β1 + Z1γ 1 + μ1




⎩  ⎪   
 
Z1 = H1δ1 + ε1




⎩  ⎪   
 
Where β, γ, and δ are coefficients to be estimated and μ and ε are random error terms. 
Then once β, γ, and δ are estimated, an estimate of Z2 can be constructed for each 
individual, and then of Y2 under the situation where members of group 2 are treated as if they are 
members of group 1 (although still subject to the error term variance experienced by group 2): 
                                                                                                                                                             
on our inequality index simulation results and consider the Oaxaca-Blinder method as a benchmark rather than 
explore multiple decompositions. 
  7 
    ˆ  Z  2 = H2
ˆ  δ  1 + ˆ  e  2
    ˆ  Y  2 = X2
ˆ  β  1 + ˆ  Z  2ˆ  γ  1 + ˆ  μ  2
  
Note that if Z contains no elements, if X2 is set to the mean values for group 2, and  ˆ  μ  2 is 
set to zero, then   corresponds to the standard estimate of what the mean of Y2 would be if 
group 2 members were treated like group 1 members, an estimate that is generally used to 
perform a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  Otherwise, this method should tend to bring the 
simulated earnings distribution for group 2 “closer” to the earnings distribution for group 1. 
ˆ  Y  2
It is therefore of interest to see how much allowing the past to be changed, i.e., allowing 
educational attainment, number of children born, and occupational sector for group 2 to be 
determined by processes that are the same as group 1 faces, changes the current earnings 
outcome for group 2.  If even this additional movement towards equalization of outcomes does 
not reduce earnings inequality significantly for the country as a whole, then it is difficult to make 
the case that earnings inequality is determined in any significant part by differences in treatment 
between the groups. 
Our estimation of Z proceeds in three steps, as some actions are considered prior to 
others:  we consider that first education is obtained, then children born, then (current) 
occupational sector entered.  The first step in this process is to estimate education level for 
members of group 1 as a function of age, mother's level of schooling (when available),
15 and 
region of birth (when available; alternatively we proxy it using current geographic location). 
Then education is simulated for members of group 2 by using their values for age and mother's 
level of schooling in the education equation for group 1. 
The second step, for women only, is to estimate the number of children for group 1 as a 
function of age, mother's level of schooling (when available), region, and education.  Then 
number of children is simulated for members of group 2 by using their values for age, mother's 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 See Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig (1998) for more exact details on how this methodology works. 
15 For the Brazilian data, where mother’s level of schooling was available, we also carried out our process with an 
additional prior step, namely simulating mother’s level of schooling.  The results from this simulation are not 
substantially different from those reported below in the text for Brazil; the main difference is that even less of 
overall variance can be attributed to between-group variance once this additional leveling step is taken. 
  8level of schooling, and (simulated) education in the fertility equation for group 1.  For men, the 
true number of children in the household is used throughout. 
The third step is to estimate the occupational sector for group 1 as a function of age, 
mother's level of schooling (when available), education, household composition, and number of 
children.  Then occupational sector is simulated for members of group 2 by using their values for 
age, mother's level of schooling, household composition, (simulated) education, and (for women, 
simulated) number of children in the household in the occupational choice equation for group 1. 
The final step is to estimate earnings for group 1 as a function of age, education, 
occupational sector, and region.  Then earnings are simulated for members of group 2 by using 
their values for age, (simulated) education, and (simulated) occupational sector in the earnings 
equation for group 1. 
Steps one through three utilize multinomial logit as the estimation technique as people 
fall into distinct groups, while step four utilizes OLS as the estimation technique for the 
continuous log earnings distribution.  For steps one through three, we draw a randomly-
generated error term for each group 2 person from a censored double exponential distribution 
standardized to reflect group 2’s estimated error term variance.  At step four, we keep the 
original error term for each group 2 person, but adjust it by multiplying it by the ratio of group 
1’s variance to group 2’s variance.
 16 
The simulations have real impacts on the Z matrices.  An example of the effect that these 
simulations can have is shown in Table 3 for the specific case of estimating number of children 
for Afro-Brazilian women under the assumption that they have the same “process” for the 
determination of quantity of children as do white Brazilian women.  While in many cases 
(between 66 and 82 percent of cases, conditional on the actual number of children) the same 
number is predicted as is actually experienced by the particular woman, in a number of other 
cases the procedure predicts more or fewer children (again conditional on the actual number of 
children and therefore upper or lower bounded for some women). 
These simulations are then used to create earnings distributions for the three groups of 
white women, nonwhite men, and nonwhite women—while actual earnings are used for white 
men.  The simulated wages are used to recalculate the inequality measures in Table 1. 
                                                 
16 For persons with no earnings originally, their earnings are estimated given the estimating equation and an error 
term is drawn for them from a normal distribution with the variance estimated from the data for that country’s 
subgroup and then scaled up or down as described in this text sentence. 
  9We expect that awarding the returns that white men face to the other groups and 
simulating the characteristics of the other groups to be more similar to those of white men would 
lead to within-group inequality that is more similar to that of white men, but that this process is 
not necessarily inequality-reducing.  In Table 1, white men had the most unequal income in 
Brazil, and they were only behind nonwhite women in terms of inequality levels in Guatemala.  
However, we also expect that this procedure will tend to reduce between-group inequality 
substantially as, based on the Oaxaca-Blinder results, it is expected to have the effect of moving 
the simulated group 2 mean closer to the actual group 1 mean.  Indeed, the simulations tend to 
reduce between-group inequalities, which has the potential to counteract an increase in within-
group inequality in Brazil and Guatemala, for example.  Thus the net effect of the simulation 
procedure on overall inequality measures may be increasing or decreasing in cases where group 
1 has both a higher variance (or other measure of spread) and a higher mean than group 2, and it 
becomes an empirical question to see which effect predominates. 
 
Results for individual earnings inequality measures 
Figures 1 and 2 provide visualizations of what both the original log earnings and the 
simulated earnings distributions look like for a couple of cases, contrasting the full simulation 
results (both simulating group 2 characteristics and holding returns to characteristics constant at 
the group 1 level across the two groups).  Figure 1 shows a case of within-gender comparison 
between racial groups (men in Guatemala), and Figure 2 shows a case of within-race comparison 
between genders (East Indians in Guyana).  In both cases we see that the simulation procedure 
has a real impact on the earnings distributions, as the distribution peaks indeed come closer 
together, in the case of East Indians, generating almost overlapping distributions in spread 
though the peak is lower for women than for men.  What is harder to tell from looking at the 
figures is whether or not the spread of the simulated distribution for group 2 is less than the 
spread of either the original distribution for group 2 or the spread of group 1’s distribution.  Thus 
we turn to our inequality measures as a way of summarizing spread. 
Table 4 shows the results from these simulations in terms of how they affect earnings 
inequality measures (as shown in the first column of Table 1).  We repeat the actual overall 
inequality measures for our samples in the first column, along with the results from two sets of 
simulations in the next six columns.  The first set of simulations holds returns to characteristics 
  10constant across the two groups (at the level of the better-off group) but allows characteristics to 
vary.  The second set of simulations not only hold returns to characteristics constant across the 
two groups, but also simulates characteristics using the technique outlined above.  The first 
simulation in each set considers what would happen to the overall earnings distribution if white 
and non-white groups are treated the same within gender, while the second simulation considers 
what would happen if women are treated like men within each racial/ethnic group. The third 
simulation considers what would happen if both women and nonwhites are treated like white 
men. 
All three simulations within each set are very similar to the original calculations using the 
observed data, with some variations depending on the inequality measure used.  The Gini shows 
very small changes, while the Theil indices exhibit similarly very little change.  There are more 
noticeable changes in the 90/10 and 50/10 ratios, with reductions in these ratios relative to the 
base case in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Guyana, and increases in the Brazilian case.  However, in 
general, simulating equality of both returns to characteristics and characteristics distributions 
tends to lead to slightly higher inequality measures (closer to the original unsimulated level) than 
if only equality of returns to characteristics is imposed.  This is a striking result that again may 
appear counterintuitive to those who had not seen the data in Table 1 before.  In addition, 
significant spread remains in all four countries’ earnings distributions under any of these 
scenarios (though less so in Guyana, which had much less spread to begin with). 
Starting with the comparison of the original (column a) and the fully simulated wages 
(column g), there is little difference in the Ginis, but the Theil and percentile ratios show some 
changes.  In Bolivia, inequality falls somewhat, which is likely due to the lowest inequality in 
that country being among white men’s wages.  However, white men also had the lowest 
inequality in Guyana, but the simulation did not yield lower Ginis in that case. 
Equal treatment by race had some effect on the inequality measures.  Column (e) allows 
differences by gender to persist, but considers the case in which nonwhite men have 
characteristics and skills that are comparable to white men’s and similarly between nonwhite 
women and white women.  The inequality values decrease or stay constant in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Guatemala, but increase in Guyana.  This may be due to the much higher inequality among Indo-
Guyanese women as compared to Afro-Guyanese women, thus increasing the Afro-Guyanese 
  11women’s inequality when they are given returns and characteristics that are more similar to Indo-
Guyanese women. 
Equal treatment by gender has no effect on the inequality measurements, except for a 
slight increase in Brazil (comparing columns f and a).  In Brazil and Bolivia, the simulations 
should have created a clear increase in inequality in Brazil (since men’s wages are more unequal 
than women’s wages, regardless of race) and a decrease in Bolivia (since men’s wages are more 
equal than women’s).  While the Brazilian simulations do show small changes in the expected 
direction, the Bolivian numbers do not show any notable changes. 
 
Within- versus between-group inequality for individual earnings measures 
The change in overall inequality, as shown in Table 4, tells us something about the 
within-group inequality, but tells us nothing about the extent of wage inequality between 
groups—which is the usual concern in group wage differentials—and it does not tell us whether 
within-group or between-group inequality is the main culprit in causing high overall inequality.  
To examine these two questions, we decompose the Theil (1) index into within and between 
sections, thereby showing very simply how much of inequality occurs within defined groups 
rather than between one or more defined groups.
17  Such a decomposition is shown in Table 5 
for both the actual and the simulated inequality measures, where the simulations are again done 
with either allowing only the betas to be simulated, or both the betas and the characteristics to
simulated.  We perform both an overall decomposition and decompositions for various 
population subgroups, including white and nonwhite men, white and nonwhite women, white 
men and women, nonwhite men and women, and white men and nonwhite women. 
 be 
                                                
For all such decompositions, it is clear that the majority of inequality occurs within rather 
than between the population subgroups, reinforcing the patterns found in Table 4.  While there 
tends to be more of a “between” effect in comparing racial/ethnic subgroups than in comparing 
genders (except for Guyana, where there is little between effect in either set of comparisons), the 
between effect is still dominated by the “within” effect.  In addition, there is little difference in 
the decompositions between the actual and simulated earnings comparisons, implying little effect 
 
17 We performed these decompositions for the Theil (0) index as well; the results are virtually identical in terms of 
the percentage attributable to between vs. within effects and thus we do not present those results; they are available 
the technical appendix in expanded Tables 5 and 7. 
  12on overall earnings inequality of equalizing pay structures across groups in comparison to almost 
any equalization that might occur within groups. 
The virtual absence of effects on the inequality measures of treating everyone like men 
may be due to several factors other than the argument that we are implicitly advancing, namely 
that overall inequality is significant within groups and dwarfs the significance of factors creating 
between-group inequality.  First, the goodness of fit of some of the simulation equations was 
low, so the extent to which the simulations were able to proxy the white men’s distribution of 
particular variables is limited.  Second, and related to the first point, the variables that are used to 
simulate the new distribution of explanatory variables are themselves based on processes of 
being from a racial, ethnic, or gender group, so the simulations may be picking up the influences 
of some group-specific characteristics that the method is intended to purge.  Third, the 
regressions omit many variables (due to data unavailability) that may be key to simulating the 
distribution of endowments or estimating the rewarding of endowments.  Most notably, the 
methodology cannot capture the quality or importance of institutions that drive the observed 
differentials, cannot control for differences in preferences, and does not control well for some 
variables such as actual labor market experience (generally considered to be a key determinant of 
gender wage differentials) or spatial dimensions of inequality that may be key to the ethnic and 
racial wage differentials.  Nonetheless, these results are striking in their consistency and size 
across both country and simulation technique. 
 
Results for per capita household earnings inequality measures 
All of the results up to this point in the paper have been in comparing individual earnings 
rather than either a broader measure of individual income or a broader measure of earnings or 
income potentially available to the individual, such as household total earnings or income.  
While these data sets do not yield good measures of income for us to use (and indeed, our focus 
in this paper is on labor income rather than overall income inequality), we can calculate 
household earnings measures to see how our various simulations affect household earnings.  
Rather than also simulating different household structures, we standardize our comparisons to a 
per capita household earnings basis in the following two tables.  However, this does allow us to 
see how per capita household earnings inequality among say, white men, is affected by the 
potentially higher (or lower) earnings that their spouses might earn under our various 
  13simulations.  In other words, we can compare available pooled labor earnings for members of our 
various gender and racial/ethnic groups rather than simply their individual earnings.  This 
involves simulating earnings for individuals in the sample, aggregating them into their actual 
households, and then ascribing per capita earnings to each individual by dividing by the number 
of people in their household (including nonearning dependents). 
Table 6 shows measures comparable to Table 4 calculated for the per capita household 
earnings measure.  Household per capita earnings inequality measures are uniformly higher than 
the comparable individual earnings inequality measures (though not as markedly so in Guyana as 
in the other three countries).  And the indexes show more significant relative reductions under 
the various simulations than do individual returns (though generally not falling to a level below 
the individual return simulation levels).  Again, simulation of both returns and characteristics 
(columns e through g) leads to less decrease in inequality than simulation of returns alone 
(columns b through d). 
Table 7 shows Theil (1) index decompositions comparable to the first panel of Table 5 
using the per capita household earnings measure, namely for the case in which we observe how 
overall per capita household earnings inequality for the society is affected if everyone is treated 
like white men.  Here again one notices the more substantial drop in inequality caused by 
equalizing treatment of persons and then pooling them into household earnings pools.  However, 
the contribution of between-group inequality to overall inequality remains low (never over 
fourteen percent of the total) and drops when either form of simulation is run, again as in the 
case of individual earnings as shown in Table 5. 
Hence the results based on individual earnings inequality can be qualified somewhat to 
say that moves to equalize returns and characteristics distributions between gender-racial-ethnic 
groups will reduce household per capita earnings inequality measurably, but substantial 
inequality remains (particularly given the higher level of inequality measured on the household 
rather than the individual level), and the remaining inequality is still (not surprisingly) 
predominantly within-group rather than between-group inequality. 
 
Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
In this paper we have shown that within-group, rather than between-group, inequality is 
the key factor underlying the high inequality observed in these four Latin American countries.  
  14While between-group differentials have been a primary focus of academics interested in 
considering inequality and its causes, reduction of such differentials is not likely to be the key to 
diminishing overall inequality, at least in the Latin American context. 
We have also shown in this paper that decreasing within-group inequality is quite 
difficult, as making adjustments at obvious entry points for such steps has little effect on the 
overall wage distribution.  When we simulated rewarding women the same as men, indigenous 
the same as non-indigenous, or black the same as white—any or all of which might occur in 
affirmative action programs—overall measured inequality changed little.
18  Similarly, when we 
simulated equalizing endowment accumulation processes among groups, there was again little 
change in the overall inequality measures. 
These results underscore the extent to which overall inequality in Latin America need not 
be particularly linked with treatment or endowment differences between groups.  From a policy 
point of view this point has three implications.  First, poverty reduction and/or income 
equalization policies do not automatically need to target race or ethnic groups to be effective.
19  
Instead, they can be targeted based on earnings standards alone—since there are poor across all 
racial and ethnic groups.  Second, anti-discrimination policies, even if successful, will not 
automatically lead to lower earnings inequality.
20  It is particularly important to untwine anti-
discrimination policies from inequality reduction policies rather than assuming that the former 
will serve as the latter as well.  Third, policies that attempt to equalize earnings-related 
characteristics across the whole population, say guaranteeing universal primary and hopefully 
also secondary education, may do more to equalize earnings than enforcement of standard anti-
discrimination policies.  The World Bank (World Bank 2004, Chapter 7) and other international 
and national policymaker groups have proposed a wide range of possibilities for changing the 
educational system (vouchers, conditional cash transfers, decentralization, etc.).  These need 
further evaluation in light of thinking about whether they will replicate inequality or reduce it. 
                                                 
18 Curiously, there are few economic studies of affirmative action in the Latin American context (World Bank 2004). 
Andrade (2004) considers the effects of quotas in universities in Brazil; Htun (2004, 2000) discusses affirmative 
action in Brazil and gender quotas in LAC more generally. 
19 We have purposely not discussed the relationship between poverty and inequality in this paper so as not to 
confound the two concepts.  Several recent works discuss poverty rates and patterns in the LAC context, including 
Wodon (2000), Wodon et al. (2001), and Gasparini et al. (2007).  Notably, Gasparini et al. find heterogeneous 
patterns for the LAC region in terms of poverty changes and economic growth. 
20 This point is made in Jacobsen (2004), which considers the US case and the rising inequality among women over 
the past few decades; in simulations similar to those in this paper, treating women more like men makes inequality 
  15Indeed, the microsimulation technique utilized in this paper can be of use in predicting 
the effects of various policies, both those that are explicitly redistributional and those that have 
redistributional side effects, whether intended or unintended.
21  In addition, by allowing for 
simulation of characteristics, such as educational attainment and fertility, that are pre-labor 
market (or outside of the labor market), policies that do not affect labor market institutions 
directly may be simulated to see what their effects are on earnings.  Such simulations may 
provide a useful supplement, a pre-test, or an alternative to vastly more expensive and time-
consuming random treatment experiments in the field.
22 
One extension of the work we do herein would be to consider programs that alter 
household structure, again either purposefully or inadvertently.  In our simulations, we take 
household structure as fixed rather than allowing for changes in household structure to occur as a 
reaction to changes in either characteristics or returns to characteristics.  Thus in our per capita 
household earnings measures, no change was hypothesized to occur in household composition 
that would affect these measures.  This extension would require additional assumptions and steps 
in the simulation procedure, but would allow for discussion and prediction of these effects. 
Reform suggestions that operate directly on the labor market can be modeled as well to 
see what effect they will have on the earnings distribution and thus on earnings and income 
inequality. Again, assumptions would have to be made about how occupational sector 
distributions and/or returns to characteristics are affected, but then hot-button topics like the 
effects of minimum wages or of labor market liberalization on earnings distributions and 
inequality measures could be modeled.  For instance, much of the research so far on the effects 
of minimum wages in Latin American countries appears to indicate it has negative effects, but 
most of the research has not utilized measures of earnings inequality.
23  Similarly, the effects of 
                                                                                                                                                             
rise more, particularly in the earlier decades when labor market discrimination was likely much stronger (i.e., before 
women’s wages began rising notably relative to men in the mid 1980s). 
21 See Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) for additional discussion of the use of microsimulation as a tool for 
evaluating redistribution policies. 
22 Indeed, in the Latin American context at least, there are relatively few such evaluation studies that consider 
differences; Patrinos et al. (2005) actually evaluate the impact of the Progresa program in Mexico on different 
ethnicities, and Schady and Araujo (2006) consider ethnic differences in program effects in the Ecuadorean context. 
23 There is certainly debate regarding minimum wage effects in Latin America.  Maloney and Nunez (2000) 
conclude the effects are large and relatively negative for their sample of 8 countries, and Arango and Pachon (2004) 
find negative employment effects particularly on the poor and on women in Colombia.  Cunningham and Kristensen 
(2000), for a sample of 19 Latin American and Caribbean counties, and Neumark et al. (2006) focus on different 
effects on different parts of the wage distribution, but do not find clear benefits for low-wage workers.  On the other 
hand, Fairris et al. (2006) conclude that declining real value of the minimum wage in Mexico, combined with other 
changes in the Mexican wage structure, was a source for the increase in wage inequality in the 80s and 90s. 
  16labor market liberalization—or the potential flip side of increased or maintained protection—on 
inequality are disputed.  On the one hand, some commentators (Arias et al. 2005, Cunningham 
and Santamaria 2003, Heller and Mahoney 2003) argue that the current set of labor regulations 
does not serve workers or firms well and also have negative effects through maintaining or 
increasing the size of the informal sector.  On the other hand, liberalization does not appear to 
have a positive effect on inequality either—one World Bank report concludes that liberalization 
in Latin America and the Caribbean has led to “on balance mild disequalizing effects” (World 
Bank 2004, p. 221).  One possibility is that liberalization may lead to income growth but not 
lower inequality, as de Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) find for 12 Latin American countries between 
1970 and 1994 (where they find reductions in poverty but not in inequality).  Microsimulations 
may help us elucidate where there are countervailing factors as well as which factor tends to 
prevail to cause a net change in inequality. 
A more difficult challenge for the microsimulation methodology, at least given current 
data constraints, is how to add in factors like differential access to social networks to gauge their 
effects on economic inequality.  It is likely that social networks, and the different results they can 
generate by gender and racial/ethnic group, are a key factor in generating inequality.
24  To the 
extent that processes such as these are not included in formal modeling, then the modeling results 
will always be open to criticism for not being able to model fully the complex dynamics that 
generate inequality.  This will be an important task for future researchers. 
Our conclusions may be viewed as radical by those who have considered inequality in 
Latin America to have a large racial and/or ethnic dimension.  Clearly other dimensions of 
inequality need to be considered besides earnings inequality, and shortcomings of the available 
data that we use need to be considered as well in terms of their ability to capture the full range of 
economic outcomes that people experience.  Nevertheless, our results, based on large survey 
data, relatively consistent across four countries, and utilizing a range of calculations in order to 
provide some robustness check, set up a challenge for those who would draw inferences based on 
alternative data that may be actually less rather than more representative of the actual situation in 
Latin America.  We hope that others will follow our path of considering how to develop 
quantitative measurements of the extent and nature of inequality along this and other dimensions 
                                                 
24 Se Lunde et al. (2007), which looks at social networks in five countries and their role in generating income for 
indigenous peoples. 
  17  18
in order that both measurement and policy may proceed conditioned on ever-increasing and more 
reliable information about how inequality operates within societies.  REFERENCES 
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Theil(1)       
Bolivia  0.60 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.69 
Brazil  0.65 0.60 0.51 0.59 0.50 
Guatemala  0.78 0.73 0.55 0.67 0.69 
Guyana  0.32 0.32 0.29 0.41 0.26 
Theil(0)       
Bolivia  0.73 0.52 0.69 0.61 0.82 
Brazil  0.58 0.56 0.45 0.53 0.44 
Guatemala  0.86 0.72 0.65 0.85 0.85 
Guyana  0.29 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.26 
G i n i        
Bolivia  0.56 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.60 
Brazil  0.57 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.49 
Guatemala  0.61 0.59 0.54 0.58 0.61 
Guyana  0.39 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.37 
90th percentile /10th percentile wages       
Bolivia  35.4 14.5 32.6 20.4 39.0 
Brazil  10.4  13.7    8.8  10.0    9.0 
Guatemala  36.8 23.2 26.2 43.2 42.8 
Guyana    5.5    4.3    5.1    4.9    5.2 
50th percentile /10th percentile wages       
Bolivia    9.8    4.2  10.7    5.9    9.6 
Brazil    2.6    3.4    2.5    2.5    2.8 
Guatemala  10.3    6.3    7.5  12.8    8.0 
Guyana    2.6    2.3    2.0    2.4    2.6 
 
  25Table 2:  Log earnings decompositions 
 
 Differential  Attributed  to 
differences in 
characteristics 
Attributed to differences 
in coefficients 
Decompositions of white men/women wage differentials 
Bolivia  0.29  -0.07  (-24%)  0.36  (124%) 
Brazil  0.41  -0.12  (-29%)  0.53  (129%) 
Guatemala  0.92   0.14  (15%)  0.78    (85%) 
Guyana  0.56   0.01    (2%)  0.55    (98%) 
Decompositions of nonwhite men/women wage differentials 
Bolivia  0.39  -0.05    (-13%)  0.44  (113%) 
Brazil  0.38  -0.14    (-37%)  0.52  (137%) 
Guatemala  0.80   0.23    (29%)  0.57    (71%) 
Guyana  0.63  -0.07  (-111%)  0.70  (111%) 
Decompositions of white/nonwhite men wage differentials 
Bolivia  0.94   0.57    (61%)  0.37    (39%) 
Brazil  0.62   0.47    (76%)  0.15    (24%) 
Guatemala  0.72   0.44    (61%)  0.28    (39%) 
Guyana  0.01  -0.04  (-400%)  0.05  (500%) 
Decompositions of white/nonwhite women wage differentials 
Bolivia  1.04   0.65    (63%)  0.39    (37%) 
Brazil  0.58   0.46    (79%)  0.12    (21%) 
Guatemala  0.60   0.45    (75%)  0.15    (25%) 
Guyana  0.07  -0.13  (-186%)  0.20  (-286%) 
Decompositions of white men/nonwhite women wage differentials 
Bolivia  1.33   0.51  (38%)  0.82    (62%) 
Brazil  1.00   0.31  (31%)  0.69    (69%) 
Guatemala  1.52   0.65  (43%)  0.87    (57%) 
Guyana  0.63  -0.11  (-17%)  0.74  (117%) 
 
  26Table 3:  Simulated v. actual number of children, women, Brazil 
 
 
Simulated number of children in actual terms
01234 > 4 Total
0 2974068 62837 45063 8299 3915 549472 3643654
1 166252 2841511 20134 529 213 496346 3524985
2 156287 64255 2710228 0 1212 442859 3374841
3 105332 96573 80433 1504710 6945 275641 2069634
4 56890 55098 69251 15938 662625 136922 996724
>4 53675 71626 105656 32697 13047 660480 937181



























Simulated number of children in percentage terms
01234
0 0.8162 0.0172 0.0124 0.0023 0.0011 0.1508
1 0.0472 0.8061 0.0057 0.0002 0.0001 0.1408
2 0.0463 0.0190 0.8031 0.0000 0.0004 0.1312
3 0.0509 0.0467 0.0389 0.7270 0.0034 0.1332
4 0.0571 0.0553 0.0695 0.0160 0.6648 0.1374




























  27Figure 1:  Simulated v. actual log earnings distributions, Men, Guatemala 
 
  28Figure 2:  Simulated v. actual log earnings distributions, East Indians, Guyana 
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Table 4:  Inequality measures for earnings, based on actual and simulated earnings within racial/ethnic 
group and within gender 
 
     Simulating returns only   Simulating returns and characteristics 
























 (a) (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g) 
Theil(1) 
Bolivia 0.60  0.53 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.55
Brazil 0.65  0.61 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.65
Guatemala 0.78  0.75 0.79 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.79
Guyana 0.32  0.35 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.33
Theil(0) 
Bolivia 0.73  0.63 0.68 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.65
Brazil 0.58  0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59
Guatemala 0.86  0.85 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.86
Guyana 0.29  0.31 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.30
Gini 
Bolivia 0.56  0.54 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55
Brazil 0.57  0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.57
Guatemala 0.61  0.61 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.63
Guyana 0.39  0.41 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40
90th percentile wages /10th percentile wages  
Bolivia 35.4  24.3 31.3 22.2 26.9 34.0 26.6
Brazil 10.4  11.8 12.2 12.1 14.2 15.5 16.7
Guatemala 36.8  32.5 27.2 23.9 30.3 28.3 21.4
Guyana 5.5  5.4 4.7 4.9 5.3 4.7 4.7
50th percentile wages /10th percentile wages  
Bolivia 9.8  7.5 9.7 7.1 7.6 9.9 7.7
Brazil 2.6  2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.3 4.2
Guatemala 10.3  9.3 7.9 7.2 8.7 7.5 5.8
Guyana 2.6  2.4 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.3
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Table 5: Theil(1) index decompositions, individual earnings inequality 
 
   Overall earnings inequality  Among men by  
race/ethinicity 
Among women by  
race/ethinicity 
Among whites by  
gender 
Among nonwhites by 
gender 
Among white men and 
nonwhite women 
    Total    Within    Between Total Within Between Total Within Between Total Within Between Total Within Between Total Within Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings  0.60  0.53  0.07 
(12%)  0.55 0.50  0.05 
(9%)  0.68 0.61  0.07 
(10%)  0.51 0.50  0.01 
(2%)  0.59 0.57  0.02 
(3%)  0.63 0.52  0.12 
(18%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns only  0.51 0.48  0.03 
(6%)  0.49 0.47  0.03 
(5%)  0.59 0.56  0.04 
(6%)  0.50 0.50  0.00 
(0%)  0.54 0.53  0.00 
(1%)  0.49 0.47  0.02 
(6%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns & characteristics  0.55 0.54  0.01 
(2%)  0.54 0.53  0.01 
(2%)  0.62 0.61  0.00 
(1%)  0.47 0.47  0.00 
(0%)  0.62 0.62  0.01 
(1%)  0.52 0.51  0.01 
(2%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings  0.65  0.57  0.07 
(11%)  0.63 0.57  0.06 
(10%)  0.61 0.57  0.05 
(7%)  0.62 0.60  0.02 
(3%)  0.52 0.51  0.01 
(2%)  0.67 0.59  0.08 
(12%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns only  0.63 0.60  0.03 
(5%)  0.62 0.59  0.04 
(5%)  0.60 0.57  0.03 
(5%)  0.61 0.61  0.00 
(0%)  0.52 0.52  0.00 
(0%)  0.62 0.60  0.02 
(3%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns & characteristics  0.65 0.63  0.02 
(3%)  0.63 0.61  0.02 
(3%)  0.60 0.58  0.02 
(3%)  0.62 0.62  0.00 
(0%)  0.51 0.51  0.00 
(0%)  0.62 0.61  0.01 
(2%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings  0.78  0.69  0.09 
(12%)  0.76 0.69  0.07 
(9%)  0.76 0.68  0.08 
(11%)  0.74 0.72  0.02 
(3%)  0.61 0.58  0.03 
(5%)  0.83 0.73  0.10 
(12%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns only  0.71 0.67  0.04 
(6%)  0.79 0.70  0.09 
(11%)  0.74 0.68  0.06 
(8%)  0.74 0.72  0.02 
(3%)  0.55 0.55  0.00 
(0%)  0.74 0.73  0.01 
(1%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns & characteristics  0.75 0.75  0.01 
(1%)  0.75 0.74  0.01 
(1%)  0.69 0.69  0.00 
(0%)  0.72 0.72  0.00 
(0%)  0.57 0.57  0.00 
(0%)  0.74 0.76  0.00 
(0%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings  0.33  0.31  0.02 
(6%)  0.31 0.31  0.00 
(0%)  0.31 0.31  0.00 
(0%)  0.35 0.34  0.01 
(3%)  0.30 0.28  0.02 
(7%)  0.32 0.30  0.02 
(6%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns only  0.34 0.34  0.00 
(0%)  0.33 0.33  0.00 
(0%)  0.37 0.36  0.01 
(3%)  0.33 0.33  0.00 
(0%)  0.30 0.29  0.00 
(1%)  0.33 0.33  0.00 
(0%) 
Simulated  earnings - 
returns & characteristics  0.33 0.33  0.00 
(0%)  0.34 0.34  0.00 
(0%)  0.41 0.41  0.00 
(0%)  0.34 0.34  0.00 
(0%)  0.30 0.30  0.00 
(0%)  0.32 0.32  0.00 
(0%) 
 Table 6:  Inequality measures for per capita household earnings, based on actual and simulated earnings 
within racial/ethnic group and within gender 
 
     Simulating returns only   Simulating returns and characteristics 
























 (a) (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g) 
Theil(1) 
Bolivia 0.77  0.55 0.57 0.50 0.59 0.63 0.57
Brazil 0.72  0.65 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.66
Guatemala 0.87  0.76 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.76
Guyana 0.37  0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.32
Theil(0) 
Bolivia 0.93  0.67 0.75 0.60 0.78 0.82 0.71
Brazil 0.68  0.63 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.64
Guatemala 0.97  0.86 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.84
Guyana 0.35  0.30 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.30
Gini 
Bolivia 0.62  0.55 0.56 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.56
Brazil 0.60  0.58 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.58
Guatemala 0.65  0.61 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.61
Guyana 0.44  0.40 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.40
90th percentile wages /10th percentile wages  
Bolivia 62.0  29.0 43.6 23.6 44.6 49.4 37.6
Brazil 17.9  16.4 19.1 17.6 16.8 18.1 17.1
Guatemala 49.5  33.9 42.8 34.5 37.0 40.9 35.5
Guyana 6.9  5.3 5.2 5.7 5.6 5.2 5.2
50th percentile wages /10th percentile wages  
Bolivia 14.5  7.7 11.7 6.3 11.4 12.2 10.1
Brazil 4.0  3.8 4.2 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0
Guatemala 10.5  8.1 9.8 8.0 9.5 10.1 9.0
Guyana 2.6  2.5 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3
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Table 7:  Theil(1) index decompositions, per capita household earnings inequality 
 

























0.72  0.66  0.58  0.65  0.57  0.64   0.08 (11%)
Simulated 
earnings - 






























0.33  0.31  0.36  0.20  0.51  0.32   0.01 (2%) 
 Table 5:  Theil index of earnings inequality decompositions 
 
(i) Decomposition of overall earnings inequality 








Within  Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.60  0.47  0.53  0.56  0.69  0.53  0.07 (12%) 
Theil (0)  0.73  0.52  0.69  0.61  0.82  0.66  0.07 (10%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.51  0.47  0.47  0.54  0.49  0.48  0.03 (6%) 
Theil (0)  0.59  0.52  0.58  0.56  0.64  0.56  0.03 (5%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.55  0.47  0.63  0.44  0.62  0.54  0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.65  0.52  0.74  0.55  0.74  0.64  0.01 (2%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.65  0.60  0.51  0.59  0.50  0.57  0.07 (11%) 
Theil (0)  0.58  0.56  0.45  0.53  0.44  0.50  0.08 (14%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.63  0.60  0.56  0.62  0.59  0.60  0.03 (5%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.50  0.57  0.52  0.54  0.04 (7%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.65  0.60  0.63  0.66  0.66  0.63  0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.59  0.56  0.54  0.59  0.57  0.56  0.02 (4%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.78  0.73  0.55  0.67  0.69  0.69  0.09 (12%) 
Theil (0)  0.86  0.72  0.65  0.85  0.85  0.75  0.11 (13%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.71  0.73  0.51  0.63  0.44  0.67  0.04 (6%) 
Theil (0)  0.71  0.72  0.58  0.66  0.63  0.67  0.05 (6%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.75  0.73  0.86  0.68  1.29  0.75  0.01 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.74  0.72  0.81  0.67  0.93  0.73  0.01 (1%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.33  0.32  0.29  0.41  0.26  0.31  0.02 (6%) 
Theil (0)  0.29  0.27  0.27  0.34  0.26  0.28  0.02 (5%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.34  0.32  0.34  0.36  0.41  0.34  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.29  0.27  0.30  0.29  0.43  0.29  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.33  0.32  0.39  0.27  0.35  0.33  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.29  0.27  0.35  0.22  0.37  0.29  0.00 (0%) Table 5 (continued) 
 
 (ii) Decomposition of earnings inequality among men by race/ethnicity 
  Total  White Men  Nonwhite Men  Within  Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.55  0.47  0.53  0.50  0.05 (9%) 
Theil (0)  0.67  0.52  0.69  0.62  0.05 (7%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.49  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.03 (5%) 
Theil (0)  0.58  0.52  0.58  0.55  0.03 (5%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.54  0.47  0.63  0.53  0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.63  0.52  0.74  0.62  0.01 (2%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.63  0.60  0.51  0.57  0.06 (10%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.45  0.51  0.06 (11%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.62  0.60  0.56  0.59  0.04 (5%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.50  0.53  0.04 (7%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.63  0.60  0.63  0.61  0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.54  0.55  0.02 (4%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.76  0.73  0.55  0.69  0.07 (9%) 
Theil (0)  0.77  0.72  0.65  0.69  0.08 (10%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.79  0.74  0.55  0.70  0.09 (11%) 
Theil (0)  0.86  0.82  0.67  0.76  0.10 (12%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.75  0.73  0.86  0.74  0.01 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.74  0.72  0.81  0.73  0.01 (1%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.31  0.32  0.29  0.31  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.33  0.32  0.34  0.33  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.29  0.27  0.30  0.29  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.34  0.32  0.39  0.34  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.35  0.28  0.00 (0%) 
 Table 5 (continued) 
 
 (iii) Decomposition of earnings inequality among women by race/ethnicity 
  Total  White Women  Nonwhite Women  Within  Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.68  0.56  0.69  0.61  0.07 (10%) 
Theil (0)  0.80  0.61  0.82  0.73  0.07 (9%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.59  0.56  0.55  0.56  0.04 (6%) 
Theil (0)  0.68  0.61  0.67  0.64  0.04 (6%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.62  0.56  0.72  0.61  0.00 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.69  0.61  0.82  0.68  0.01 (1%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.61  0.59  0.50  0.57  0.05 (7%) 
Theil (0)  0.55  0.53  0.44  0.49  0.05 (10%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.60  0.59  0.52  0.57  0.03 (5%) 
Theil (0)  0.54  0.53  0.46  0.50  0.04 (7%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.60  0.59  0.56  0.58  0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.54  0.53  0.50  0.52  0.02 (4%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.76  0.67  0.69  0.68  0.08 (11%) 
Theil (0)  0.95  0.85  0.85  0.85  0.10 (11%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.74  0.67  0.73  0.68  0.06 (8%) 
Theil (0)  0.94  0.85  0.93  0.88  0.07 (6%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.69  0.67  0.84  0.69  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.87  0.85  1.05  0.86  0.01 (1%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.31  0.41  0.26  0.31  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.29  0.34  0.26  0.29  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.37  0.41  0.34  0.36  0.01 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.34  0.34  0.33  0.33  0.01 (3%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.41  0.41  0.39  0.41  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.35  0.34  0.43  0.35  0.00 (0%) Table 5 (continued) 
 
 (iv) Decomposition of earnings inequality among whites by gender 
  Total  White Men  White Women  Within  Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.51  0.47  0.56  0.50  0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.52  0.61  0.55  0.01 (3%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.50  0.47  0.54  0.50  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.53  0.52  0.56  0.53  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.47  0.47  0.44  0.47  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.53  0.52  0.55  0.53  0.00 (0%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.62  0.60  0.59  0.60  0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.53  0.55  0.02 (4%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.61  0.60  0.62  0.61  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.56  0.56  0.57  0.56  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.62  0.60  0.66  0.62  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.59  0.57  0.00 (0%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.74  0.73  0.67  0.72  0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.79  0.72  0.85  0.77  0.02 (3%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.74  0.73  0.67  0.72  0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.79  0.72  0.85  0.77  0.02 (3%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.72  0.73  0.68  0.72  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.71  0.72  0.67  0.71  0.00 (0%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.35  0.32  0.41  0.34  0.01 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.30  0.27  0.34  0.28  0.01 (5%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.33  0.32  0.36  0.33  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.27  0.27  0.29  0.27  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.34  0.32  0.39  0.34  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.35  0.28  0.00 (0%) Table 5 (continued) 
 
 (v) Decomposition of earnings inequality among nonwhites by gender 
  Total  Nonwhite Men  Nonwhite Women  Within  Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.59  0.53  0.69  0.57  0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.75  0.69  0.82  0.73  0.02 (3%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.54  0.53  0.56  0.53  0.00 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.70  0.69  0.78  0.70  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.62  0.53  0.81  0.62  0.01 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.77  0.69  0.98  0.76  0.01 (1%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.52  0.51  0.50  0.51  0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.46  0.45  0.44  0.45  0.01 (2%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.52  0.51  0.53  0.52  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.45  0.45  0.46  0.45  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.51  0.51  0.51  0.51  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.45  0.45  0.46  0.45  0.00 (0%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.61  0.55  0.69  0.58  0.03 (5%) 
Theil (0)  0.75  0.65  0.85  0.71  0.04 (5%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.55  0.55  0.48  0.55   0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.65  0.65  0.68  0.65  0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.57  0.55  0.74  0.57  0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.67  0.65  0.83  0.67  0.00 (0%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.30  0.29  0.26  0.28  0.02 (7%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.26  0.27   0.02 (5%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.30  0.29  0.32  0.29   0.00 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.35  0.28   0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.30  0.29  0.33  0.30   0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.36  0.28   0.00 (0%) Table 5 (continued) 
 
 (vi) Decomposition of earnings inequality among white men and nonwhite women 
  Total  White Men  Nonwhite Women  Within  Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.63  0.47  0.69  0.52   0.12 (18%) 
Theil (0)  0.79  0.52  0.82  0.66   0.13 (16%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.49  0.47  0.49  0.47   0.02 (6%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.52  0.64  0.55   0.03 (6%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.52  0.47  0.62  0.51   0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.61  0.52  0.74  0.60   0.01 (2%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.67  0.60  0.50  0.59   0.08 (12%) 
Theil (0)  0.63  0.56  0.44  0.52   0.11 (17%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.62  0.60  0.59  0.60   0.02 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.52  0.55   0.02 (4%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.62  0.60  0.66  0.61   0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.57  0.56  0.57  0.56   0.01 (2%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.83  0.73  0.69  0.73   0.10 (12%) 
Theil (0)  0.89  0.72  0.85  0.75   0.14 (16%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.74  0.73  0.44  0.73   0.01 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.74  0.72  0.63  0.72   0.02 (3%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.76  0.73  1.29  0.76   0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.74  0.72  0.93  0.74   0.00 (0%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.32  0.32  0.26  0.30   0.02 (6%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.26  0.27   0.01 (4%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.33  0.32  0.41  0.33   0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.43  0.28   0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.32  0.32  0.35  0.32   0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.28  0.27  0.37  0.28   0.00 (0%) Table 7:  Theil index of overall per capita household earnings inequality decompositions 
 








Within  Between 
Bolivia 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.77  0.69  0.63  0.65  0.76  0.67   0.11 (14%) 
Theil (0)  0.93  0.71  0.86  0.78  1.02  0.83   0.10 (11%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.57  0.47  0.50  0.67  0.40  0.50   0.07 (12%) 
Theil (0)  0.71  0.60  0.67  0.78  0.46  0.65   0.07 (9%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.50  0.45  0.55  0.39  0.53  0.49   0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.60  0.55  0.64  0.44  0.61  0.59   0.01 (2%) 
Brazil 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.72  0.66  0.58  0.65  0.57  0.64   0.08 (11%) 
Theil (0)  0.68  0.64  0.53  0.63  0.53  0.59   0.09 (13%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.72  0.67  0.62  0.67  0.62  0.66   0.06 (8%) 
Theil (0)  0.69  0.65  0.58  0.65  0.59  0.62   0.07 (10%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.85  0.74  0.92  0.82  0.96  0.84   0.01 (1%) 
Theil (0)  0.83  0.72  0.90  0.77  0.91  0.82   0.01 (1%) 
Guatemala 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.87  0.83  0.62  0.55  0.75  0.77   0.10 (11%) 
Theil (0)  0.97  0.91  0.77  0.82  0.80  0.85   0.12 (12%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.76  0.74  0.55  0.50  0.59  0.68   0.08 (11%) 
Theil (0)  0.84  0.82  0.67  0.67  0.68  0.75   0.09 (11%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.79  0.74  0.92  0.82  0.75  0.77   0.02 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.86  0.81  0.79  0.83  0.76  0.83   0.03 (3%) 
Guyana 
Observed earnings 
Theil (1)  0.37  0.33  0.42  0.31  0.30  0.36   0.01 (3%) 
Theil (0)  0.35  0.30  0.41  0.33  0.35  0.35   0.01 (2%) 
Simulated earnings — returns only 
Theil (1)  0.32  0.31  0.35  0.23  0.34  0.32   0.00 (0%) 
Theil (0)  0.30  0.26  0.33  0.27  0.34  0.30   0.00 (0%) 
Simulated earnings — returns and characteristics 
Theil (1)  0.33  0.31  0.36  0.20  0.51  0.33   0.01 (2%) 
Theil (0)  0.31  0.26  0.37  0.28  0.49  0.30   0.01 (3%) 
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Table A-1:  OLS log earnings regressions
(i) Bolivia
Variable label White Men Indigenous   Men White Women
Indigenous
Women
         
Primary 0.40* 0.39** 0.57* 0.56**
  (0.20)  (0.12) (0.22) (0.16)
Secondary 0.66** 0.65** 0.97** 0.78**
   (0.20) (0.13) (0.24) (0.18)
Tertiary 1.00** 0.92** 1.21** 1.17**
  (0.21) (0.14) (0.25) (0.18)
Age 0.10** 0.05** 0.08** 0.07**
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal sector wage employee 0.61** 0.73** 0.66** 0.62**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.16) (0.19)
Informal sector wage employee 0.50** 0.75** 0.23 0.25*
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.12)
Public sector employee 0.29* 0.71** 0.42** 0.97**
  (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12)
Urban 1.04** 1.22** 1.19** 1.08**
(0.12) (0.07) (0.19) (0.12)
Constant 2.83** 3.32** 2.58** 2.42**
(0.29) (0.25) (0.43) (0.40)
Number of Observations 923 1510 586 753
Adjusted R-squared 0.40 0.51 0.38 0.39
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level33
Table A-1 (continued)
(ii) Brazil
Variable label White Men Afro- Men White Women Afro- Women
         
1 year of schooling 0.10** 0.00 0.07 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
2 years of schooling 0.05* 0.04 -0.03 0.08
(0.03) (0.12) (0.05) (0.04)
3 years of schooling 0.10** 0.05 -0.01 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
4 years of schooling 0.20** 0.08** 0.07 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
5 years of schooling 0.18** 0.06 0.03 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
6 years of schooling 0.20** 0.08* 0.11 0.13**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
7 years of schooling 0.20** 0.06 0.10 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
8 years of schooling 0.27** 0.07 0.17** 0.14*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
9 years of schooling 0.25** 0.05 0.18** 0.13*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
10 years of schooling 0.22** 0.06 0.20** 0.16*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
11 years of schooling 0.42** 0.17** 0.39** 0.28**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
12 years of schooling 0.52** 0.39** 0.61** 0.47**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
13 years of schooling 0.53** 0.30** 0.59** 0.57**
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
14 years of schooling 0.53** 0.34** 0.72** 0.66**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
15 years of schooling 0.75** 0.45** 0.82** 0.78**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
16 years of schooling 0.78** 0.62** 1.02** 0.86**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
17 years of schooling 0.97** 0.64** 1.11** 1.07**
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.08** 0.06** 0.09** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother’s years of schooling^2 -0.005** -0.003* -0.006** -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002)
Age 0.08** 0.06** 0.05** 0.03**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.0004**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age*Schooling 0.001** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
With labor card 0.04** 0.11** 0.19** 0.32**34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Without labor card -0.30** -0.20** -0.20** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Public sector -0.05** 0.14** 0.07** 0.28**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Employer 0.62** 0.77** 0.91** 1.14**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
North -0.17** -0.10** -0.13** -0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Northeast -0.44** -0.39** -0.52** -0.48**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
South -0.13** -0.11** -0.12** -0.07**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Center-West -0.07** 0.02 -0.12** -0.04*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Urban 0.34** 0.29** 0.33** 0.36**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 3.68** 3.85** 3.69** 3.66**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Number of Observations 32,417 26,507 19,750 14,251
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level35
Table A-1 (continued)
(iii) Guatemala
Variable label White Men Indigenous     Men White Women Indigenous Women
         
Primary 0.40** 0.26** 0.31 0.22
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.13)
Secondary 0.53** 0.58** 0.39 0.45
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.23)
Tertiary 1.58** 0.96** 0.39 1.62*
  (0.26) (0.20) (0.46) (0.82)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.06** 0.05 0.02 0.05
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.04** 0.04** 0.08** 0.05**
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Formal sector wage employee 1.23** 1.66** 1.93** 1.86**
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.15)
Informal sector wage employee 0.98** 1.07** 1.18** 0.76**
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10)
Public employee 1.36** 1.97** 2.24** 1.41**
  (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.41)
Guatemala City -0.19* -0.08 0.43* 0.28
  (0.10) (0.33) (0.17) (0.20)
Rural -0.45** -0.36** -0.29 -0.54**
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.12)
Constant 4.82** 4.60** 3.40** 4.18**
(0.21) (0.30) (0.65) (0.40)
Number of Observations 2795 1990 1363 906
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.21
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level36
Table A-1 (continued)
(iv) Guyana
Variable label Indo- Men Afro- Men Indo- Women Afro- Women
         
Primary 0.05 0.21 0.41** 0.12
(0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.24)
Secondary 0.21* 0.34* 0.71** 0.34
(0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.24)
Tertiary 0.54** 0.68** 1.30** 0.71**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.32) (0.25)
Age 0.09** 0.06** 0.04* 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age^2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Employee -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.31**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Georgetown 0.03 -0.03 0.53** 0.53**
(0.12) (0.08) (0.19) (0.10)
Rural -0.07 -0.22** 0.26 0.31**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10)
Constant 8.34** 8.68** 7.89** 8.16**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.45) (0.35)
Number of Observations 866 720 279 481
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% levelTable A-2:  Simulated v. actual years of schooling and employment sector, Brazil
(i) Simulated v. actual years of schooling
Nonwhite men
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
0 6316 133 171 234 684 75 99 54 205 46 50 274 12 10 13 64 30 3743 12213
1 5 1155 3 16 59 14 17 14 44 11 17 58 4 3 4 18 7 378 1827
2 8 8 1823 28 135 46 38 32 74 26 35 138 6 2 10 28 15 676 3128
3 1 3 1 2401 94 33 30 33 94 44 37 138 9 9 7 44 21 894 3893
4 2 2 0 5 4902 31 35 41 115 64 58 213 17 18 18 71 54 1548 7194
5 0 0 0 1 23 1990 12 28 70 45 51 139 14 16 18 31 17 707 3162
6 0 0 0 2 12 3 1452 5 37 23 29 115 10 11 5 24 15 442 2185
7 0 1 0 3 25 3 4 1498 46 25 34 125 4 12 12 37 18 512 2359
8 0 0 0 1 30 0 0 0 2960 12 20 111 16 16 22 60 32 1009 4289
9 0 0 0 1 5 0 2 0 9 794 6 33 8 5 9 18 12 199 1101
10 0 1 0 0 11 0 1 0 12 1 823 37 5 4 11 18 10 228 1162
11 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 3201 10 12 20 51 43 890 4233
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 124 1 2 3 1 22 154
13 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 155 1 5 1 27 192
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 149 1 0 32 182
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 421 6 63 497
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 238 40 280
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 103 106
Total 6332 1303 1999 2692 5982 2195 1690 1705 3667 1091 1165 4584 240 275 309 894 521 11513 48157
Simulated years of schoolingWhite Women
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
0 4575 97 41 110 267 19 17 26 71 0 9 52 2 3 1 19 28 3737 9074
1 0 805 0 5 14 2 2 4 9 0 0 5 0 1 1 5 8 282 1143
2 31 21 1791 16 54 3 8 5 18 1 5 21 1 0 1 8 10 549 2543
3 48 27 10 2871 45 4 4 9 24 1 2 26 3 3 2 12 22 1004 4117
4 98 67 28 20 7898 43 32 24 72 4 27 44 7 7 1 44 96 2494 11006
5 41 14 6 11 8 2060 2 6 6 1 3 4 0 1 0 5 9 611 2788
6 21 11 2 5 6 6 1648 1 7 1 2 4 0 1 0 1 5 514 2235
7 36 21 9 16 12 17 8 1801 5 5 5 2 0 0 0 1 5 496 2439
8 33 32 15 24 24 33 28 21 4539 4 4 16 4 4 1 10 49 1274 6115
9 17 12 10 6 19 37 12 17 23 1124 5 5 1 1 0 2 9 267 1567
10 18 10 10 8 16 37 49 38 37 19 1513 0 3 2 2 0 8 326 2096
11 86 47 40 60 117 122 112 124 214 60 76 7146 12 23 21 59 188 1715 10222
12 5 0 3 2 5 9 13 9 14 9 11 6 452 2 5 0 4 93 642
13 4 2 3 4 3 5 15 5 14 2 6 2 0 590 0 1 3 99 758
14 4 3 3 6 21 17 10 10 40 5 8 27 5 6 629 6 21 113 934
15 24 7 6 17 50 27 21 36 95 13 37 117 15 32 13 2096 80 409 3095
16 2 0 0 1 2 6 2 3 10 2 3 0 2 2 2 0 918 138 1093
17 2 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 388 403
Total 5045 1176 1977 3183 8562 2450 1983 2139 5200 1252 1716 7477 508 678 680 2269 1466 14509 62270
Simulated years of schoolingNonwhite Women
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total
0 6023 161 164 240 811 32 48 35 180 13 25 188 11 9 18 63 38 4236 12295
1 0 1028 1 4 47 1 5 4 14 0 2 26 2 2 1 4 12 365 1518
2 30 11 1795 22 126 19 16 13 57 11 16 63 5 3 8 21 17 684 2917
3 56 30 17 2429 97 19 20 25 60 12 16 79 5 6 11 32 27 958 3899
4 84 15 8 11 5020 41 24 13 52 16 24 101 17 11 10 66 51 1706 7270
5 33 16 2 6 29 1974 8 3 29 4 4 37 5 5 11 16 19 815 3016
6 23 10 2 2 4 14 1400 4 25 11 8 30 7 5 3 15 20 515 2098
7 23 11 5 3 8 6 3 1562 23 7 12 26 9 9 1 11 11 617 2347
8 19 7 1 0 3 2 0 0 3031 3 10 40 9 16 7 28 34 947 4157
9 11 4 1 1 9 0 1 6 17 890 8 23 5 8 5 13 10 262 1274
10 10 4 0 1 1 18 5 6 21 8 988 23 9 3 8 8 15 302 1430
11 54 22 4 8 31 17 20 15 59 6 14 3967 20 37 24 65 72 1187 5622
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 141 4 1 1 3 21 172
13 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 1 1 0 39 184
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 214 3 3 33 255
15 5 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 2 581 20 89 706
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 178 32 210
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 73 74
Total 6371 1320 2000 2729 6188 2143 1550 1687 3570 981 1127 4603 245 265 325 929 530 12881 49444
Simulated years of schoolingTable A-2 (continued)
(i) Simulated v. actual employment sector
Nonwhite men
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer
0.8627 0.0329 0.0378 0.0486 0.0035 0.0144
0.0055 0.9294 0.0224 0.0285 0.0018 0.0124
0.0063 0.0187 0.9441 0.0172 0.0004 0.0133
0.0123 0.0276 0.0235 0.9258 0.0020 0.0088
0.0172 0.0521 0.0736 0.0601 0.7709 0.0261
0.0020 0.0201 0.0322 0.0402 0.0040 0.9015
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer Total
10631 406 466 599 43 178 12323
56 9457 228 290 18 126 10175
74 220 11086 202 5 156 11743
115 257 219 8632 19 82 9324
37 112 158 129 1656 56 2148
2 20 32 40 4 897 995
Total 10915 10472 12189 9892 1745 1495 46708
White Women
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer
0.4309 0.1602 0.2428 0.1284 0.0138 0.0239
0.0000 0.9212 0.0625 0.0114 0.0000 0.0049
0.0057 0.0253 0.9463 0.0080 0.0048 0.0099
0.0010 0.0354 0.0720 0.8774 0.0033 0.0108
0.0114 0.0925 0.1968 0.0631 0.5989 0.0373
0.0000 0.0279 0.1611 0.0440 0.0043 0.7626
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer Total
15697 5834 8845 4677 503 871 36427
0 4523 307 56 0 24 4910
53 234 8757 74 44 92 9254
6 203 413 5031 19 62 5734
38 308 655 210 1993 124 3328
0 26 150 41 4 710 931
Total 15794 11128 19127 10089 2563 1883 60584
Nonwhite women
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer
0.4323 0.1732 0.2097 0.1511 0.0111 0.0226
0.0000 0.9397 0.0435 0.0085 0.0000 0.0083
0.0044 0.0375 0.9365 0.0044 0.0024 0.0147
0.0020 0.0518 0.0919 0.8385 0.0031 0.0127
0.0235 0.1278 0.1691 0.0682 0.5644 0.0471
0.0000 0.0130 0.0433 0.0173 0.0000 0.9264
Non income earner Self Employed With Labor Card W/out Labor card Public Sector Employer Total
12740 5105 6179 4454 326 667 29471
0 3756 174 34 0 33 3997
26 219 5472 26 14 86 5843
13 335 594 5419 20 82 6463
49 266 352 142 1175 98 2082
0 3 10 4 0 214 231






Simulated occupationTable A-3:  Multinomial logits for education, number of children, and sector
(i) Bolivia
Educational Multinomial
White Men (N=616) Nonwhite Men (N=1000) White Women (N=645) Nonwhite Women (N=1114)
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Age 0.108 0.013 0.076 -0.021 -0.135* -0.020 -0.202* -0.336** -0.232* -0.050 -0.282** -0.067
(0.079) (0.082) (0.084) (0.049) (0.058) (0.068) (0.087) (0.089) (0.106) (0.038) (0.043) (0.057)
Age^2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 -0.000 0.002** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Chuquisaca -17.331** -16.400** -16.917** -17.537** -17.961** 1.204 0.072 -1.404 -0.876 -16.724** 2.570** 3.469**
(1.703) (1.972) (1.576) (1.810) (1.306) (1.495) (1.282) (2.030) (1.671) (0.888) (0.934) (0.873)
La Paz -17.209** -15.382** -16.897 -16.539** -16.385** 2.261 0.622 -0.784 -0.702 -14.883** 4.675** 4.073**
(0.758) (1.181) (.) (1.816) (1.284) (1.574) (1.273) (1.997) (1.654) (0.831) (0.853) (0.854)
Cochabamba -18.828** -17.069** -18.375** -16.093** -16.815** 2.509 1.499 0.307 -0.013 -14.955** 3.908** 4.319**
(1.599) (1.838) (1.438) (1.836) (1.320) (1.577) (1.205) (1.967) (1.649) (0.906) (0.924) (0.895)
Oruro -18.917** -16.551** -17.629** -16.681** -16.449** 2.639 0.370 -1.186 -0.390 -15.522** 4.644** 4.822**
(1.588) (1.840) (1.406) (1.905) (1.417) (1.558) (1.269) (1.998) (1.653) (0.895) (0.906) (0.923)
Potosi -0.489 1.531 0.116 -16.698** -17.180** 1.996 0.042 -1.251 -0.375 -15.828** 3.844** 3.435**
(1.014) (.) (1.192) (1.820) (1.291) (1.553) (1.252) (1.979) (1.624) (0.862) (0.868) (0.845)
Tarija -21.194** -18.793** -20.700** -18.553** -19.785 -0.082 0.904 -0.976 -0.639 -15.679** 3.780 4.274**
(1.451) (1.713) (1.247) (1.526) (.) (1.826) (1.330) (2.114) (1.725) (0.967) (.) (1.036)
Santa Cruz -19.344** -17.859** -20.003** -17.506** -17.652** 1.787 1.031 -0.351 -0.583 -15.590** 4.906** 4.112**
(1.394) (1.672) (1.218) (1.840) (1.328) (1.632) (1.230) (1.973) (1.621) (0.903) (0.941) (0.983)
Beni -20.117** -18.070** -20.497** -16.629** -16.943** 2.199 1.922 0.916 0.414 -15.504** 5.486** 4.550
(1.472) (1.741) (1.344) (1.890) (1.393) (1.578) (1.348) (2.046) (1.737) (0.979) (0.983) (.)
Urban 0.920 2.138** 3.195** 1.282** 2.758** 2.813** 2.141** 4.026** 4.240** 1.333** 2.225** 2.712**
(0.591) (0.613) (0.695) (0.313) (0.358) (0.411) (0.502) (0.574) (0.708) (0.210) (0.290) (0.420)
Constant 19.870** 19.669** 18.644** 19.950** 21.399** -0.569 6.464* 9.030** 6.448* 18.261 1.201 -3.335*
(2.020) (2.241) (1.981) (2.142) (1.783) (.) (2.614) (3.023) (2.982) (.) (1.242) (1.449)
Demographic Multinomial
White Women (N=976) Nonwhite Women (N=1686)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age -0.056 0.028 0.003 0.516** 0.722** -0.026 -0.016 0.184* 0.403** 0.778**
(0.054) (0.080) (0.116) (0.189) (0.271) (0.047) (0.056) (0.084) (0.141) (0.216)
Age^2 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009** -0.012** -0.000 -0.001 -0.004** -0.007** -0.012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Primary 0.469 0.055 -0.082 -0.173 -0.980 0.040 0.251 -0.298 0.099 0.093
(0.420) (0.465) (0.436) (0.951) (0.665) (0.238) (0.256) (0.265) (0.303) (0.361)
Secondary 0.463 -0.436 -0.940 -0.868 -2.266** -0.309 -0.334 -1.079** -1.210* -1.684*
(0.480) (0.515) (0.518) (1.090) (0.832) (0.376) (0.379) (0.406) (0.490) (0.742)
University -0.066 -0.818 -1.379* -3.683** -34.006** -0.227 -0.309 -1.700** -2.095** -2.351*
(0.484) (0.516) (0.561) (1.273) (0.724) (0.347) (0.375) (0.453) (0.591) (1.081)
Urban 0.134 -0.201 -0.529 -1.010 -1.213* 0.083 -0.430* -0.380 -0.806** -1.570**
(0.346) (0.344) (0.366) (0.605) (0.522) (0.204) (0.209) (0.223) (0.263) (0.330)
Constant 1.748 1.830 2.274 -6.605 -8.639 1.895 2.422* -0.705 -4.796 -11.309**
(1.282) (1.646) (2.257) (3.141)* (4.688) (1.156) (1.215) (1.632) (2.490) (3.770)Occupational Multinomial
White Men (N=1363) Nonwhite Men (N=2016) White Women (N=1507) Nonwhite Women (N=2107)
Variable Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner
Primary 1.750 18.239** 0.596 1.054 0.499 18.637** 0.309 1.279 -15.663** 3.957 -16.528** -16.378** 3.721** 2.881 3.255* 3.010*
(1.298) (2.228) (1.264) (1.316) (0.836) (1.825) (0.800) (0.919) (2.576) (.) (2.419) (2.431) (1.573) (1.742) (1.535) (1.535)
Secondary 1.042 19.199** -0.019 0.596 -0.931 18.485** -0.863 -0.056 -17.541** 3.856** -19.207** -18.529** 0.924 2.735* -0.296 -0.263
(1.272) (2.217) (1.239) (1.289) (0.851) (1.788) (0.816) (0.961) (2.707) (1.124) (2.509) (2.533) (1.214) (1.386) (1.142) (1.133)
University 0.129 19.705** -0.826 0.242 -1.293 19.067** -2.293** -0.042 -17.327** 4.620** -20.439** -19.340** 0.451 2.649 -2.067 -1.726
(1.261) (2.158) (1.222) (1.268) (0.884) (1.725) (0.858) (1.003) (2.569) (1.140) (2.393) (2.412) (1.209) (1.467) (1.150) (1.131)
Age -0.150 0.215* -0.152 -0.443** -0.132 0.054 -0.091 -0.346** -0.253 0.253 -0.240* -0.484** -0.288 -0.188 -0.296 -0.513*
(0.084) (0.105) (0.084) (0.083) (0.074) (0.093) (0.072) (0.073) (0.143) (0.162) (0.120) (0.116) (0.208) (0.213) (0.203) (0.201)
Age^2 0.002 -0.002 0.002* 0.006** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.003 -0.003 0.003* 0.006** 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Average age of hh 0.002 0.012 0.007 0.025 0.051* 0.052* 0.063** 0.068** -0.018 0.024 0.002 0.015 0.048 0.023 0.027 0.033
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.044) (0.048) (0.042) (0.042)
average # in hh w/no ed 1.863 3.808 2.552 -0.036 -2.342 -3.834* -3.146* -3.770* -0.559 -1.825 -2.313 -1.980 98.559 98.501** 100.359** 101.487**
(1.879) (2.029) (1.914) (2.017) (1.484) (1.658) (1.470) (1.512) (1.841) (1.875) (1.506) (1.436) (.) (2.005) (1.243) (1.242)
average # in hh w/pr ed 0.226 0.108 0.673 -1.441 -1.662 -2.671* -2.691* -3.075* 1.423 -1.243 0.044 0.494 19.613 21.189** 21.328 22.156
(0.978) (1.108) (1.066) (1.103) (1.279) (1.328) (1.306) (1.314) (1.658) (1.727) (1.459) (1.455) (.) (8.105) (14.299) (.)
average # in hh w/sec ed -0.576 0.005 0.119 -1.189 -2.157 -2.907* -2.770* -3.189* 0.669 -0.024 0.149 0.623 18.008 20.065 19.894 20.393**
(0.848) (1.011) (0.942) (0.948) (1.209) (1.245) (1.215) (1.250) (1.499) (1.571) (1.323) (1.334) (.) (.) (.) (4.727)
average # in hh w/ter ed -1.288 -0.948 -0.788 -1.491 -2.337* -2.453* -2.888* -2.744* -0.187 -0.653 -0.799 -0.105 16.500 20.059 19.405 20.093
(0.939) (1.022) (1.024) (1.093) (1.191) (1.236) (1.228) (1.231) (1.467) (1.496) (1.245) (1.243) (.) (.) (.) (11.584)
Number of children in hh -0.076 -0.187 -0.035 -0.277* -0.068 0.019 -0.050 -0.130 0.146 0.116 0.099 0.122 0.214 -0.212 0.117 0.113
(0.115) (0.154) (0.119) (0.124) (0.110) (0.132) (0.106) (0.119) (0.173) (0.190) (0.158) (0.151) (0.202) (0.231) (0.194) (0.191)
Number of teens in hh -0.024 -0.078 -0.255 0.013 0.231 0.291 0.170 0.381* 0.205 0.360 0.085 0.191 -0.424 -0.188 -0.470 -0.292
(0.171) (0.218) (0.172) (0.179) (0.174) (0.193) (0.168) (0.179) (0.243) (0.278) (0.230) (0.208) (0.264) (0.263) (0.240) (0.234)
Number of adults in hh 0.041 0.018 -0.062 0.163 0.117 0.078 0.094 0.086 -0.091 0.045 0.139 0.159 0.248 0.295 0.104 0.240
(0.160) (0.179) (0.158) (0.162) (0.178) (0.209) (0.172) (0.185) (0.190) (0.189) (0.177) (0.165) (0.505) (0.520) (0.498) (0.495)
Number of elderly in hh -0.683 -0.870 -0.590 -0.893 -0.496 -0.250 0.201 0.054 0.337 -0.753 -0.089 -0.160 -2.777** -1.765 -2.052* -2.302*
(0.453) (0.473) (0.450) (0.462) (0.492) (0.582) (0.447) (0.471) (0.549) (0.614) (0.533) (0.513) (1.012) (0.954) (0.944) (0.940)
Household head -0.553 -1.023 0.009 -1.706** -0.739 -0.323 0.697 -2.440** -0.013 1.451 1.799 0.636 19.837 22.398** 21.747* 19.927
(0.563) (0.602) (0.580) (0.591) (0.678) (0.808) (0.684) (0.676) (1.111) (0.981) (0.979) (0.926) (.) (7.786) (9.447) (.)
Spouse -1.147 -2.600 -0.055 -1.942 -1.845 -5.345** -1.753 -3.481* -0.356 0.593 1.255* 1.070* -0.137 1.474 1.100 0.857
(1.227) (1.566) (1.399) (1.889) (1.256) (1.479) (1.174) (1.438) (0.642) (0.649) (0.570) (0.530) (0.902) (1.199) (0.876) (0.843)
Urban -0.614 -0.871 -1.847* -1.340 -0.723 -1.725** -2.387** -1.468* 0.089 -2.075 -0.587 -1.187 -18.104 -20.297 -18.634** -19.252**
(0.823) (0.980) (0.813) (0.820) (0.572) (0.629) (0.549) (0.586) (1.205) (1.276) (1.134) (1.118) (12.971) (.) (2.981) (2.982)
Constant 4.511* -23.219 4.919* 10.526** 6.487** -17.021 6.250** 10.913** 22.584** -8.701** 24.194 28.897** 3.812 0.041 4.856* 9.593**
(2.012) (.) (2.002) (2.032) (1.607) (.) (1.606) (1.649) (2.316) (3.231) (.) (0.878) (2.232) (0.000) (2.088) (2.022)
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% levelTable A-3 (continued)
(ii) Brazil
Educational Multinomial
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Men Men Women Women
Variable (N=43,303) (N=36,820) (N=48,285) (N=36,736)
Age
Age^2 See Table A-2 (i);
Mother's years of schooling full results
Mother's years of schooling^2 for all
North 18 categories






White Women (N=38,989) Nonwhite Women (N=28,443)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age 0.077** 0.301** 0.422** 0.491** 0.623** 0.048** 0.164** 0.254** 0.380** 0.551**
(0.009) (0.015) (0.026) (0.040) (0.059) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.031)
Age^2 -0.002** -0.004** -0.006** -0.007** -0.008** -0.001** -0.002** -0.004** -0.005** -0.007**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling -0.034** -0.048** -0.097** -0.192** -0.278** -0.015** -0.026** -0.065** -0.142** -0.222**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Mother's years of schooling -0.056** -0.054** -0.078** -0.188** -0.241** -0.044** -0.073** -0.111** -0.124** -0.253**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) (0.055) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.034) (0.046)
North 0.544** 0.846** 1.056** 1.624** 1.703** 0.188** 0.469** 0.825** 1.054** 1.792**
(0.103) (0.108) (0.126) (0.169) (0.221) (0.075) (0.076) (0.084) (0.107) (0.108)
Northeast 0.329** 0.501** 0.745** 1.196** 1.541** 0.092* 0.272** 0.429** 0.607** 0.932**
(0.049) (0.052) (0.064) (0.092) (0.113) (0.045) (0.047) (0.055) (0.073) (0.081)
South 0.083* 0.036 -0.014 0.019 -0.135 -0.098 -0.005 0.049 0.045 -0.213
(0.035) (0.038) (0.051) (0.088) (0.124) (0.084) (0.086) (0.102) (0.138) (0.176)
Center-West 0.065 0.256** 0.394** 0.235* 0.100 -0.071 0.105 0.105 0.026 -0.269*
(0.052) (0.053) (0.067) (0.120) (0.172) (0.061) (0.061) (0.072) (0.100) (0.126)
Urban -0.020 -0.094 -0.191** -0.351** -0.696** -0.013 -0.066 -0.243** -0.409** -0.636**
(0.048) (0.050) (0.061) (0.086) (0.099) (0.052) (0.053) (0.059) (0.072) (0.073)
Constant -0.199 -4.051** -6.641** -8.420** -11.210** -0.087 -1.979** -3.801** -6.637** -9.861**
(0.178) (0.273) (0.464) (0.719) (1.079) (0.189) (0.225) (0.310) (0.420) (0.574)Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level
Occupational Multinomial
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Men Men Women Women
Variable (N=52,927) (N=46,683) (N=60,562) (N=48,053)
Years of schooling
Years of schooling^2 See Table A-2 (ii);
Age full results
Age^2 for all
Age*years of schooling 5 categories
Average age of hh by race-gender group
Average schooling of hh available 
Number of children in hh upon 
Number of adults in hh request












White Men (N=3381) Nonwhite Men (N=2374) White Women (N=4205) Nonwhite Women (N=3035)
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Age -0.042 -0.124** 0.135 -0.047* 0.054 0.299 -0.067** -0.074* 0.315** -0.082** -0.183** 0.048
(0.022) (0.035) (0.075) (0.022) (0.081) (0.208) (0.016) (0.030) (0.121) (0.020) (0.059) (0.089)
Age^2 -0.000 0.001 -0.002** 0.000 -0.002 -0.005* 0.000 -0.000 -0.005** 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother's years of schooling 0.345** 0.546** 0.764** 0.641** 0.823** 0.955** 0.314** 0.581** 0.793** 0.385** 0.578** 0.678**
(0.047) (0.051) (0.060) (0.139) (0.154) (0.181) (0.045) (0.053) (0.060) (0.096) (0.110) (0.134)
Guatemala City 0.200 -0.099 -0.715 0.288 -0.080 1.328 -0.376* -0.660* -1.061 0.188 -0.649 -40.915**
(0.234) (0.304) (0.624) (0.566) (0.815) (1.273) (0.175) (0.274) (0.655) (0.603) (1.163) (0.777)
Rural -0.657** -2.136** -3.411** -0.879** -2.302** -4.618** -1.017** -2.650** -2.604** -0.826** -3.478** -3.090*
(0.162) (0.214) (0.446) (0.178) (0.364) (1.118) (0.114) (0.208) (0.427) (0.141) (0.411) (1.253)
Constant 2.914** 4.161** -3.461* 2.528** -0.051 -6.952 2.943** 2.169** -7.956** 2.190** 2.735* -4.141
(0.532) (0.736) (1.622) (0.504) (1.326) (4.566) (0.371) (0.610) (2.221) (0.418) (1.076) (2.175)
Demographic Multinomial
White Women (N=3519) Nonwhite Women (N=2436)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age -0.151** -0.163** -0.138** -0.033 0.220* -0.066 -0.106* 0.005 0.412** 0.474**
(0.031) (0.034) (0.040) (0.062) (0.105) (0.046) (0.053) (0.067) (0.101) (0.107)
Age^2 0.001** 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.005** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.007** -0.008**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Primary -0.140 -0.192 -0.477* -0.458* -0.658** 0.218 -0.086 -0.143 -0.586* -0.764**
(0.183) (0.185) (0.186) (0.211) (0.220) (0.246) (0.255) (0.255) (0.253) (0.247)
Secondary -0.437 -0.641* -0.767* -0.968 -0.869 0.138 -0.977 -1.207 -1.967* -1.580*
(0.285) (0.306) (0.309) (0.735) (0.831) (0.569) (0.693) (0.669) (0.813) (0.786)
University 0.109 -0.058 -1.398 -1.572 -0.850 1.367 0.953 -44.689 -44.715 -44.342
(0.576) (0.687) (0.775) (1.150) (0.948) (1.100) (1.029) (.) (.) (.)
Mother's years of schooling -0.012 -0.028 -0.052 -0.190** -0.205* -0.067 -0.083 -0.165 -0.117 -0.199
(0.029) (0.035) (0.037) (0.073) (0.086) (0.074) (0.077) (0.106) (0.089) (0.129)
Guatemala City -0.061 0.137 -0.093 0.254 0.095 0.702 0.599 1.145 1.418 0.980
(0.254) (0.268) (0.313) (0.381) (0.457) (0.938) (0.955) (0.898) (1.013) (1.060)
Rural -0.004 0.292 0.610** 0.791** 1.023** 0.719** 0.873** 0.745** 1.034** 1.278**
(0.184) (0.179) (0.192) (0.239) (0.328) (0.234) (0.238) (0.268) (0.266) (0.246)
Constant 5.058** 5.600** 5.361** 2.904* -1.532 2.156 3.702** 2.156 -4.938** -6.363**
(0.794) (0.813) (0.913) (1.202) (2.046) (1.130) (1.245) (1.447) (1.880) (2.000)Occupational Multinomial
White Men (N=4790) Nonwhite Men (N=3341) White Women (N=5471) Nonwhite Women (N=3781)
Variable Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner Informal Public Self-empl Nonearner
Primary -0.403* 1.167** -0.237 -0.376 -0.394 0.015 -0.292 -0.488* -1.342** -0.296 -1.407** -1.328** -1.070 -0.170 -0.506 -1.052
(0.183) (0.378) (0.184) (0.204) (0.218) (0.510) (0.220) (0.236) (0.324) (0.763) (0.307) (0.295) (0.655) (0.876) (0.642) (0.612)
Secondary -0.743** 1.344** -0.293 -0.013 -0.991* 1.274 -1.184* -0.479 -2.265** 0.599 -1.791** -1.597** -0.717 1.518 -0.092 -0.634
(0.246) (0.495) (0.248) (0.248) (0.490) (0.789) (0.534) (0.470) (0.408) (0.786) (0.393) (0.365) (1.080) (1.606) (1.057) (1.004)
University -1.734** 1.547** -0.943* -0.754* -2.725* 3.256** -1.576* -1.476* -2.434** 1.467 -1.916** -2.288** 509.228 -552.763 916.862 474.418
(0.379) (0.582) (0.384) (0.363) (1.061) (0.919) (0.768) (0.650) (0.504) (0.803) (0.553) (0.469) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Age -0.090** 0.009 0.042 -0.173** -0.114* -0.017 -0.032 -0.222** -0.106 0.054 -0.103 -0.290** -0.112 0.224 -0.060 -0.181*
(0.031) (0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.086) (0.049) (0.047) (0.057) (0.097) (0.057) (0.053) (0.091) (0.175) (0.090) (0.087)
Age^2 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.002* 0.000 0.002** 0.004** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Average age of hh 0.029** 0.022* 0.032** 0.047** 0.008 -0.003 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.024* 0.062 -0.083 0.045 0.054
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.035) (0.086) (0.035) (0.035)
average # in hh w/no ed -0.728* -0.934 -0.729* -0.984** -0.020 20.151** 0.176 -0.279 -1.077 -1.635 -1.222* -0.845 -0.724 2.160 -0.366 -0.260
(0.369) (0.531) (0.369) (0.381) (0.706) (1.902) (0.704) (0.749) (0.562) (1.010) (0.512) (0.480) (0.787) (1.177) (0.739) (0.687)
average # in hh w/pr ed -0.770* -0.647 -0.664 -1.215** -0.187 19.875** -0.070 -0.693 -0.677 -0.224 -0.767 -0.434 0.038 4.112** 0.266 0.085
(0.344) (0.427) (0.350) (0.345) (0.714) (1.881) (0.718) (0.751) (0.458) (0.758) (0.418) (0.401) (0.900) (1.556) (0.863) (0.829)
average # in hh w/sec ed -1.077** -0.689 -0.895* -1.533** -0.392 20.655** -0.321 -0.690 -0.689 -1.156 -1.072* -0.831 0.355 3.507* 0.752 0.234
(0.368) (0.421) (0.383) (0.367) (0.717) (1.930) (0.724) (0.790) (0.471) (0.788) (0.446) (0.431) (1.328) (1.748) (1.296) (1.289)
average # in hh w/ter ed -1.971** -1.151 -0.013 -0.875 -1.308 19.621** 0.127 0.303 -0.020 -0.616 -0.413 -0.054 33.550 -105.202 -65.199 -33.196
(0.609) (0.654) (0.567) (0.490) (1.456) (2.229) (1.295) (1.117) (0.679) (0.812) (0.675) (0.602) (20667255) (809517922)(49197247) (14706146)
Number of children in hh 0.106* -0.142* 0.009 -0.037 0.080 0.140 0.078 0.100* 0.023 -0.135 0.081 0.098 0.188 -0.716 0.231 0.265
(0.044) (0.064) (0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.091) (0.048) (0.049) (0.081) (0.124) (0.079) (0.075) (0.234) (0.590) (0.230) (0.221)
Number of teens in hh 0.196** -0.105 0.053 0.232** -0.216* -0.089 -0.205* 0.002 -0.032 0.140 0.028 -0.024 -0.128 -1.065 -0.090 -0.054
(0.063) (0.096) (0.067) (0.067) (0.086) (0.160) (0.087) (0.090) (0.107) (0.170) (0.106) (0.093) (0.224) (0.702) (0.220) (0.211)
Number of adults in hh 0.009 0.064 -0.048 0.002 0.032 0.265 0.077 0.122 0.001 -0.072 -0.068 -0.011 0.213 4.114 0.423 0.400
(0.056) (0.081) (0.062) (0.058) (0.095) (0.173) (0.106) (0.096) (0.087) (0.172) (0.086) (0.080) (0.815) (2.274) (0.812) (0.717)
Number of elderly in hh -0.137 -0.075 -0.252 -0.468** -0.126 0.512 0.115 -0.159 -0.175 -0.063 -0.116 -0.147 -0.560 0.807 -0.326 -0.291
(0.174) (0.309) (0.184) (0.181) (0.288) (0.444) (0.301) (0.296) (0.274) (0.440) (0.273) (0.246) (0.851) (1.081) (0.855) (0.814)
Household head 0.106 0.457 0.817** -1.157** -0.416 1.226 0.494 -1.522** -0.957 -0.415 0.415 -0.363 1.133 0.767 2.131 0.980
(0.263) (0.469) (0.291) (0.272) (0.365) (0.861) (0.427) (0.377) (0.529) (0.620) (0.490) (0.483) (1.932) (2.129) (1.909) (1.861)
Spouse 0.583 0.950 0.826 -0.254 20.126** 23.868 21.819** 19.548** -0.129 -0.054 1.577** 1.497** 0.224 0.348 1.713 1.593
(0.768) (1.043) (0.786) (1.013) (1.040) (.) (0.995) (1.081) (0.313) (0.464) (0.329) (0.285) (0.893) (1.032) (0.907) (0.858)
Guatemala City 1.630** 2.073** 1.561** 1.510** 1.553 -31.779** 2.138* 1.261 0.373 0.424 0.823* 0.775* 0.989 -5.106 2.090* 2.392**
(0.317) (0.424) (0.329) (0.335) (0.935) (1.815) (0.969) (1.053) (0.363) (0.574) (0.355) (0.337) (1.131) (4.206) (0.902) (0.728)
Rural 0.349* 0.304 0.841** 0.460** 0.395 -0.074 0.474* 0.826** 0.304 0.043 0.949** 1.465** 0.685 2.215** 1.221* 1.346*
(0.156) (0.335) (0.163) (0.171) (0.222) (0.418) (0.228) (0.240) (0.260) (0.511) (0.250) (0.229) (0.596) (0.831) (0.585) (0.566)
Constant 1.785** -3.362** -2.424** 2.535** 3.633** -24.132 0.550 4.426** 3.980** -2.930 1.912 6.417** 1.424 -13.325* -1.333 2.427
(0.569) (1.104) (0.613) (0.616) (0.945) (.) (0.958) (0.985) (1.018) (1.938) (0.982) (0.937) (2.763) (6.475) (2.674) (2.553)
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% levelTable A-3 (continued)
(iv) Guyana
Educational Multinomial
Indo Men (N=1232) Afro Men (N=1116) Indo Women (N=1265) Afro Women (N=1308)
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Age 0.006 -0.008 0.142 -0.020 0.059 0.192** -0.007 -0.048 0.271 0.044 0.070 0.235**
(0.030) (0.039) (0.080) (0.047) (0.051) (0.063) (0.029) (0.043) (0.151) (0.034) (0.040) (0.056)
Age^2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 0.000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Georgetown 0.094 0.610 -0.178 0.926 0.938 1.089 0.349 0.736 1.588 0.415 0.625 1.251*
(0.591) (0.628) (0.732) (0.687) (0.686) (0.732) (0.445) (0.517) (1.159) (0.492) (0.496) (0.578)
Rural -0.619 -1.084* -2.274** -0.246 -1.345** -1.418* -0.258 -0.437 -0.678 -0.536 -1.267** -0.397
(0.483) (0.522) (0.619) (0.496) (0.501) (0.570) (0.346) (0.418) (1.117) (0.403) (0.411) (0.510)
Constant 2.546** 2.400** -1.691 3.035** 2.250* -2.822* 2.789** 3.271** -7.470* 1.879* 2.261** -3.627**
(0.790) (0.918) (1.647) (1.019) (1.072) (1.364) (0.708) (0.901) (3.447) (0.802) (0.867) (1.196)
Demographic Multinomial
Indo Women (N=927) Afro Women (N=815)
Variable 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children 1 children 2 children 3 children 4 children > 4 children
Age -0.112** -0.190** -0.250** 0.260 -0.034 0.043 0.042 0.142* 0.055 0.195
(0.039) (0.045) (0.052) (0.203) (0.262) (0.042) (0.050) (0.069) (0.072) (0.144)
Age^2 0.001 0.001* 0.002** -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.003** -0.001 -0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Primary -0.453 -0.555* -0.613 -0.404 -0.815 -0.364 -1.742** -1.390* -1.728* -1.819*
(0.252) (0.278) (0.351) (0.582) (0.824) (0.626) (0.596) (0.680) (0.705) (0.830)
Secondary -0.283 -0.518 -0.482 -0.560 -32.077 -0.554 -1.923** -1.953** -2.259** -3.300**
(0.337) (0.358) (0.449) (0.726) (4344017) (0.652) (0.622) (0.707) (0.753) (0.963)
University -0.078 -0.558 -31.104 -31.099 -31.464 -0.278 -1.955** -2.643** -38.123 -38.432
(0.723) (0.906) (5303136) (8367188) (15581502) (0.685) (0.674) (0.837) (29.564) (41.077)
Georgetown 0.111 0.300 -0.585 -0.861 -0.440 -0.447 -0.536 -1.019** -1.303** -0.162
(0.411) (0.450) (0.620) (0.830) (1.456) (0.285) (0.303) (0.343) (0.500) (0.871)
Rural -0.113 -0.028 -0.193 -0.667 -0.515 -0.186 -0.433 -0.528 -0.145 0.807
(0.347) (0.385) (0.473) (0.602) (1.101) (0.282) (0.304) (0.327) (0.416) (0.787)
Constant 3.294** 5.585** 6.187** -3.227 1.310 0.333 2.255* 0.312 1.091 -2.230
(0.964) (1.039) (1.205) (3.569) (4.577) (1.075) (1.121) (1.449) (1.555) (2.737)Occupational Multinomial
Indo Men (N=1144) Afro Men (N=1026) Indo Women (N=1198) Afro Women (N=1229)
Variable Unemployed Self-empl Employee Unemployed Self-empl Employee Unemployed Self-empl Employee Unemployed Self-empl Employee
Primary 1.799 0.555 0.320 18.290** 0.733 0.751 0.155 0.147 -0.475 0.105 -0.162 0.752
(1.120) (0.351) (0.299) (1.480) (0.573) (0.455) (0.698) (0.309) (0.322) (0.790) (0.563) (0.527)
Secondary 0.836 0.565 0.076 18.586** 0.630 0.895 0.837 0.030 0.634 0.580 0.139 1.245*
(1.271) (0.416) (0.354) (1.487) (0.611) (0.482) (0.787) (0.450) (0.368) (0.797) (0.586) (0.535)
University 2.498 0.867 0.832 18.639** 0.109 1.643** -31.513 -33.929 1.450* 0.584 -1.005 2.141**
(1.634) (0.730) (0.629) (1.773) (0.785) (0.594) (36282908) (20552719) (0.732) (1.008) (0.792) (0.580)
Age 0.004 0.345** 0.229** 0.265** 0.318** 0.331** 0.001 0.292** 0.213** 0.124 0.316** 0.272**
(0.103) (0.053) (0.040) (0.082) (0.048) (0.039) (0.103) (0.055) (0.050) (0.066) (0.059) (0.035)
Age^2 -0.001 -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.004** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Average age of hh -0.013 -0.025 -0.033** -0.023 -0.004 0.011 0.019 -0.029* -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 -0.007
(0.028) (0.013) (0.011) (0.025) (0.014) (0.011) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009)
average # in hh w/no ed 1.638 2.080* 3.089** -228.203 -0.134 -0.172 -0.243 1.066 0.096 -2.252 0.876 0.805
(1.597) (0.820) (0.753) (14656729) (0.880) (0.710) (1.404) (0.690) (0.721) (1.596) (0.930) (0.645)
average # in hh w/pr ed 0.174 1.236 2.571** -0.003 0.619 0.083 -0.580 0.118 -0.038 -1.002 0.747 0.015
(1.421) (0.700) (0.651) (1.099) (0.638) (0.537) (1.263) (0.618) (0.612) (0.817) (0.574) (0.441)
average # in hh w/sec ed -2.434 1.611* 2.477** -0.608 0.655 0.146 -1.197 -0.611 -0.881 -1.411 0.223 0.352
(2.033) (0.719) (0.667) (1.050) (0.625) (0.518) (1.284) (0.638) (0.613) (0.781) (0.551) (0.410)
average # in hh w/ter ed 2.787 0.410 2.336* -0.817 0.310 -0.253 -109.375 1.087 0.754 -2.499* 0.659 0.204
(2.159) (1.393) (1.092) (1.495) (0.888) (0.694) (16379087) (0.923) (0.793) (1.247) (0.758) (0.514)
Number of children in hh -0.118 0.125 0.103 0.342** 0.185* 0.129 0.271 -0.107 -0.114 0.070 -0.003 -0.088
(0.229) (0.093) (0.083) (0.122) (0.083) (0.068) (0.139) (0.097) (0.085) (0.089) (0.073) (0.053)
Number of teens in hh -0.318 -0.234 -0.125 0.138 -0.171 -0.007 0.173 0.238 0.060 -0.006 0.035 0.085
(0.297) (0.125) (0.102) (0.168) (0.129) (0.095) (0.207) (0.124) (0.111) (0.141) (0.115) (0.079)
Number of adults in hh 0.096 -0.014 -0.098 -0.048 -0.108 -0.079 -0.127 -0.100 -0.174 0.204 -0.142 -0.052
(0.234) (0.102) (0.083) (0.145) (0.098) (0.067) (0.207) (0.113) (0.097) (0.107) (0.114) (0.066)
Number of elderly in hh 0.779 0.363 0.194 0.675 0.371 -0.085 -0.750 0.419 -0.544 0.390 -0.729 0.104
(0.527) (0.290) (0.234) (0.543) (0.305) (0.252) (0.775) (0.321) (0.365) (0.446) (0.494) (0.234)
Household head 1.429 2.299** 1.440** -1.039 1.898** 1.257** 1.336 0.509 0.018 -0.394 1.709** 0.147
(0.882) (0.407) (0.331) (0.677) (0.404) (0.320) (0.894) (0.455) (0.429) (0.569) (0.450) (0.273)
Spouse 0.839 1.066 -0.124 -33.298 0.131 0.340 -0.437 -0.708 -1.480** -0.778 0.129 -1.534**
(1.267) (0.596) (0.531) (9012395) (0.624) (0.455) (0.696) (0.373) (0.322) (0.452) (0.420) (0.240)
Georgetown 19.907** -0.585 -0.003 -0.598 0.386 0.417 -0.394 -0.033 0.852* -0.467 -0.139 0.250
(2.307) (0.501) (0.419) (0.420) (0.346) (0.265) (0.854) (0.465) (0.399) (0.339) (0.289) (0.213)
Rural 19.048** 0.115 0.048 -1.710** 0.908** 0.827** -0.419 -0.533 -0.384 -1.006** -0.323 0.098
(2.252) (0.418) (0.365) (0.508) (0.329) (0.257) (0.644) (0.384) (0.361) (0.362) (0.288) (0.215)
Constant -22.368 -7.989** -4.445** -22.831 -8.394** -6.935** -2.566 -6.328** -3.153** -2.702* -7.757** -5.945**
(.) (1.157) (0.926) (.) (1.113) (0.874) (1.928) (1.165) (0.999) (1.358) (1.226) (0.841)
Standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 99% level; * significant at 95% level